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VI Executive Summary 
THE PRESENT STUDY  is an outcome of  research carried out by the author under 
the Farmer-Managed Irrigation Systems (FMIS)  Program of IIMI. The study 
was based mostlyonavailableliterature,and partly on theauthor’sexperience 
in the small-scale irrigation sector under the District Integrated Rural Devel- 
opment Programs (Hambantota and Badulla) of the Ministry of Plan Imple- 
mentation and under the FMIS theme of IIMl in the North Central Province. 
The study reviewed three government strategies and two nongovernment 
strategies which have ken  implemented as assistance programs to improve 
andenhance thesmall irrigationsectorduring thelast twodecades. It wasalso 
based largely on the research findings and presentations made at workshops 
on specific subjects conducted by IIMl and the Agricultural Research and 
Training Institute (ARTI). 
The intervention styles of these alternative strategies were reviewed in 
terms of approach, planning and implementation, farmer mobilization, and 
degree of success. The Village Irrigation Rehabilitation Project (VIRP) has 
made considerable impact on the physical improvement of malfunctioning 
schemes, increasing the water delivery to a certain extent.  However, in the 
area of farmer mobilization for efficient water management and sustainable 
system management, the intended targets have not been achieved owing to 
poor farmer involvement throughout the rehabilitation process.  Two differ- 
ent  styles  of  strategies in  the  Integrated  Rural  Development  Programs 
(IRDPs) have been reviewed.  The World Bank strategy of the Kurunegala 
program was mare or less similar to the VIRP strategy, bath of which assisted 
in the rehabilitation of village irrigation schemes concentrating basically on 
the irrigation component.  The rolling planning strategy of  the Hambantota 
program evolved a systems approach comprising an integrated development 
package.  The overall IRDP approach was mare organized and Coordinated. 
and the Hambantota program in particular has shown successful results in 
vii system management.  The Anuradhapura  Dry-Zone  Agriculture  Project 
(ADZAP) exemplified ineffective project planning, designing and imple- 
menting.  Although the project envisaged alleviating poverty by  assisting 
(.henu  (swidden) cultivators to  become permanent farmer settlers, its highly 
politicized and bureaucratized  implementation prevented the beneficiaries 
from receiving the intended henefits. 
The NGO style of  intervention by the Freedom From Hunger Campaign 
Board (FFHC) has shown some success in the area of  farmer mobilization 
even though the physical progress ofthe program appears to  becomparatively 
slow.  The National Development Foundation (NDF) which is a variant of 
FFHC, followed a more dynamic approach for farmer mobilization for both 
system improvement and management which have been assessed as succcss- 
ful although NDF presently operates at a very small scale. 
There are similarities as well as disparities in these strategies. The direct 
and top-down approach to varying degrees is a dominant feature in all state 
interventions  while FFHC and NDF have followed a nongovernment  ap- 
proach which is either indirect or catalytic.  The NGOs have developed their 
strategies throughawcw-suhhu (akindnfreservoircounci1)i-esulting  inmore 
farmer  mobilization  and  participation  than  in  the  state stretegies.  The 
advantageofthe  blueprint-typestate interventionsoverthoseofNGOs is their 
adherence to a systematic monitoring and evaluation process throughout the 
project period. The NGOs are poor in project-input management but they are 
fairly strong in farmer management. 
The sustainability of system performance after the withdrawal of assist- 
ance is the boiling issue pertaining to FMIS in Sri Lanka.  It is noted that 
achieving system sustainability  by  farmers'  management is  possible  by 
properly  blending  the  positive  features found  in  all  of  these  alternative 
strategies. Several aspects like rational selection of systems, proper farmer 
mobilization and participation, integrated project planning, land consolida- 
tion, ensured farmers'  leadership, and proper management and coordination 
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Introduction 
SIricr; THL EARLY 1970s, both government and nongovernment organizations 
in Sri Lanka have been initiating minor tank rehabilitation programs aiming 
at better water management practices, increased agricultural productivity and 
thus, enhanced living conditions of  Ihc rural communities. The strategies of 
these assistance programs for minor irrigation improvement differ from one 
another in  tams of intervention approach, seleclion criteria, planning and 
implementing procedure, farmer participation, and management practices. 
This paper summarizes these aspects  ofthe different alternative strategies and 
makcs a comparative assessment of thz approaches in ordcr to make recom- 
mendations for sustainable impriivement and management of village irriga- 
tion systems. 
As mentioned at the beginning, this study was based mainly on available 
literature which comprised survey reports, seminar papers, and other pub- 
lished  and unpublished  study  reports  on  different  aspects  of  Ihc  minor 
irrigation sector in Sri Lanka.  Most of  the research  011  minor irrigation 
systems was carried out  during  the  last  two decades.  Information  not 
available in the literature was obtained through interviews with the relevant 
heads of departmentsoragencies (e.g.,  theDepanment of Agrarian Services). 
While the author’s field experience, particularly in state interventions like the 
Integrated  Rural Development Programs and the Village Irrigation Reha- 
bilitation Project, was uscful in the study, findings of the recent studies and 
workshops carried out by IlMl enhanced the information round through the 
literature survey. 
Irrigation  is  an  integral pan of Sri Lankan agricuhurc, since the very 
beginning of the island’s recorded ancient civilization which dates back to the 
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5th century B.C.  Throughout this period of 2,500 years, the economy of the 
country has been based heavily on irrigated agriculture.  Thc peculiarity of 
irrigation in Sri Lanka lies in its indigenous technology, the dedication of the 
country’s rulers, full participation of the farmers, and the sustainability of  the 
irrigation systems for centuries.  Thc drainage pattern with a large number of 
river basins and the nionsoon rainfall distribution have provided the basis for 
irrigated agriculture in Sri Lanka (Figure  I).  A large number of irrigation 
systems come under the category of “minor irrigation schemes” which are 
also  called  “small  irrigation”  or  “villagc  irrigation.”  The International 
Irrigation  Managcinent  Institute (IIMI) has categorized  them  as Farmcr- 
Managed Irrigation Systems (FMIS).  The scale of FMIS varies from very 
small irrigation schemes to largecomplexes of systems (in Nepal somc FMIS 
extend up to 15,ooO  hectares [ha])  but according to the Sri Lankan classifi- 
cation, FMIS are those systems which have command areas of 80 ha (200 
acres) or less. These systems come under the purview of the Department of 
Agrarian Services (DAS). 
The  livelihoodofdry-7.c~ne  peasants of Sri Lanka is inseparably linked with 
the village tank which is the first element of a threefold system: MXWQ  (tank), 
yuya (rice field) and henu (upland swidden). 
Our of the total asweddumizecl(irriRated and rain-fed)  areaminor irrigation 
accounts for 40 percent  and contributcs to about 30 perccnt  of the total 
irrigated area.  According lo the estimates of the Ministry of Lands and Land 
Development, there are some 23,000 village irrigation schemes, out of which 
13,000 arc tanks and the rest, anicut schemes. Another source reveals that in 
9 districts of  the dry zone, there arc 7,758 village tanks (FA0 1980). The 
average command area of thesc tanks varies from 4 to 56 ha  (I 0 to 140  acres). 
It is also estimated that 50percentof the total village irrigation schcmes in Sri 
Lanka are in working condition, providing ample opportunities for rehabili- 
tation and/or improvement by different types ofintervention. Today, with the 
recent Mahaweli development, the total share of minor irrigation schemes 
would still be a third ofthe total irrigated area in Sri Lanka. 
The total area of Sri Lanka is 6.5 million ha (16.2 million acres) with an 
estimated population of  I6  million.  The rural population is about 80 percent 
of the total and agriculture accounts for 25 percent of the gross domestic 
product, 70percent of the exporteamings,  50 percent of  the total employment, 
and 40 percent of the total government revenue.  The area under pennanenl 
cultivation is 2.25 million ha (5.56 million acrcs) of  which rice accounts for 4  A  REVIEW 01  ALTERIVATIIF SIRKIKGIES FOR IMPROVING FMI.7 
0.7 million ha (1.73 inillion acres). The majority of irrigated agriculture is in 
the dry zone where 70 percent of the country’s irrigation is found; over 90 
percent of the dry-zone irrigation works are under village irrigation (Gunadasa 
et al.  IYXO).  The village irrigation sector is predominant  in thc dry zone. 
Almost all of these systems in the dry zone are village tanks. In the wet zone, 
anicut schemes (s1.ream diversions) are dominant while in the intermediate 
zone both village tanks and anicuts are equally important. 
The small-scale irrigation systems developed in the early period of  Sri 
Lanka’s history  were  community-based  and essentially  farmer-managed. 
The small reservoirs were collectively constructed. maintained and managed 
by the communities.  The village was based on a tank and when more tanks 
were constructed tor increased population they were called ,qam,qodu. Since 
the inhabitants of early dry-zone settlements had hceii farmers for genera- 
tions, irrigation discipline has been an important part of  their way of life 
throughout history.  The experiences of developing  small-scale irrigation 
systems managed by village communities had probably led to the develop- 
ment  of  la[-gcr irrigation  systems found  in  thc  dry  zone  (Gunaratne  & 
Maddurna Bandara 198’)). 
The 12th century witnessed the beginning of  the collapse of  the highly 
developed irrigation systems that tlourished in the dry zone up to then.  The 
irrigation  systems were ahandoned, as the cwnrnunities that depeiided 011 
themmigrated towardthe wetzoneofSri Lank& When thebritishintroduced 
the plantation industry in the 19th century and abolished rujakurfya (a  task a 
person was duty-hound to do for the king), the irrigation sector in a11 parts of 
the islanddeterioratedfurther. Soon after, the British realized the importance 
ofrcviving these systems and started state-intervention programs for assisting 
minor irrigation systems. 
State intervention to rcfurbish ininor irrigation  works thus commenced 
during the British colonial period (about Ihe mid-19th century). The British 
recognized the  need  to  revive practices  and customs that  facilitated  the 
construction, repair, and maintenance of irrigation works and thosc which 
regulated water distribution and agricultural practices.  Refiire Ceylon (now 
Sri Lanka) gained independence in I948 the rulers made attempts to meet the 
food requirement from within the local production resulting in the improve- 
ment of irrigation schemes, mainly large-scale irrigation works IikeDewahuwa, 
Padaviya, Rajangana, etc.  Emphasis was  given  to  resloratioii  of  minor 
irrigation only in the late 1950s which became more intense since the early 
1970s. CHAPTER 2 
An Overview of Alternative Strategies 
THE  DECENTRALIZED  BUDGET  introduced  in 1972 made provision  for each 
Member ol Parliament (MP) to take under his or her wing the improvements 
of physical infrastructure in his or her constituency.  Minor repairs to village 
irrigation schemes thus constituted one  of the popular items in the decentral- 
ized budget estimates since then; the decentralized budget funds also com- 
prised the only financial resource available to attend to immediate repairs of 
the minor irrigation systems in the villages.  As the annual decentralized 
budget allocation per constituency was limited to approximately US$83,000 
(Rs 500.000) during the  1970s, the improvements to  minor systems were 
restricted to rcpairs to the sluice, spill andbund ofa  working tank. Rehabilitation 
or complete refurbishment or even major improvements were not possible 
within the decentralized budget whose allotments had to be used for other 
infrastructural development works as well.  With the introduction of direct 
investment in small irrigation systems, since 1978, the decentralized budget 
was relievedofshouldering the responsibility ofsmall irrigation sector works 
in some districts. 
State intervention in the minor irrigation sector has substantially increased 
since 1978; several development programs were initiated during the early 
1980s.  The first ever large-scale project solely meant for minor irrigation 
development in Sri Lanka is the Village Irrigation Rehabilitation Project 
(VIRP), which commenced in 1980.  It differed from other state or NGO 
inlerventions in that it did not cover just one or afew  districts but covered the 
dry zone  in its entirety consisting of  14  districts where the potential  for 
rehabilitation of minor irrigation existed. The project comprised the compo- 
nents of  rehabilitation, moderniration, and water management, which were 
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crucial for productivity  and sustainability of  minor  systems.  The VIRP 
covered 1,200  minor schemes in the dry zmc  (with small pockets in the wet 
and inlermediate zones), and 3 I.500 ha ofirngable  area benefiting 20,000 to 
25,000 fann families (World Bank 1981). 
The  concept of  the  District  Integrated  Rural  Development  Programs 
(District IRDPs) introduced hy the  1977 government brought large-scale 
investmcnl in integrated sectoral development at district level.  The minor 
irrigation sector was onc of the priority project areas identified within IRDPs 
by both the Government of Sri Lanka and various donor agencies.  As the 
irrigation sectnr plays a crucial role in the agricultural economy of the dry 
zone in  particular, eight of  the district IRDPs in the dry zone picked  up 
irrigation projects (both minor and major) for integrated development; the 
minor irrigation sector was hasically improved under a “package program.” 
It is noteworthy that the World Bank-funded IRDPs (with long-term loans) 
have more sector-biased minor irrigation components while bilaterally funded 
(outright grant) IRDPs have a package program where physical improve- 
ments to irl-igation systems are linked  with  several other socioeconomic 
components (e.g.. Hainbantota IRDP).  During the initial 5-year period of the 
first few IRDPs, 25 to 35 percent of the total investment was allocated to  the 
irrigalion component (mainly minor irrigation sector). 
The Anurddhdpura  Dry-Zone Agriculture Project (ADZAP) is the next 
massive project geared for improvement of the minor irrigation seclor in the 
largest district of Sri Lanka, Anui-adhapura, which is in the North Central 
Province. The project commenced its activities in  1981. The ADZAP was 
funded by the Askan Development Bank (ADB), the International Fund for 
Agricultural Development (IFAD), and the Government of Sri Lanka.  The 
project aimed to provide a viable farming system through careful develop- 
ment of local resources as an alternative to  semi-shifting chena (swidden) 
cultivation. The project had the components of rehabilitation of  minor tanks, 
for both rice and upland cultivation, livestock development, rural roads and 
agricultural infrastructure.  The project work terminated by September IYXY 
after seven years of operation including a two-year extension period follow- 
ing the  targeted  five-year pcriod  (1982-1987).  Transformation  of  chena 
cultivation into a permanent Palming syslem had  been emphasi7.ed as the 
major element of this strategy. 
In parallel with these government strategies for minor irrigation improve- 
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improvement of the minor irrigation sector starting from the early 1980s. Of 
these NGO interventions the Small Reservoir Village Community Rehabili- 
tation Project comcs under the National Freedom From Hunger Campaign 
Board  (FFHC), a statutory board  which  has been  functioning  under the 
auspices of the  Ministry  of  Agriculture  since the  1970s.  The  scale  of 
intervention of FFHC in terms of money was small compared to any state- 
intervention stratcgy hut it covered several districts embracing alarge number 
of  small  irrigation  systcms.  The FFHC  strategy  was  to  restore  village 
reservoirs with the help of bcneficiaries themselves to assure the supply of 
water for rice and other crops.  The strategy emphasized the use of manual 
labor and available local resources ratherthan the useofhcavy machinery and 
equipmentand major emphasis was laid on “lank organization”or wew-sahha 
in organizing the activities involved, based on  the “peoplc’s participation” 
concept.  The FFHC had tank rehabilitation projccts in eight districts with 
major clusters of  tanks in Anuradhapura, Puttalam and Moneragala districts. 
By mid-I989 it had rehabilitated over I35 tanks out of a target of 222 village 
tanks.  There were over 3,089  families involved with a target developed area 
of 2,SOl ha (6,178 acres) of highland. 
The National Development Foundation (NDF) is a variant of FFHC, and 
has developed astrategy for  renovation of irrigation reservoirs in Kurunegdla 
District. The NDF’s strategy is more community-based and il is a real NGO 
by definition. Thc tanks are selected, planned and renovated by thc village 
community and financial contribution is made by the villagers. the Govem- 
ment of  Sri Lanka and NDF.  It also emphasizes farmers’ contributions in 
terms of labor and other resources hut whenever necessary, suitable machin- 
ery  is  used  for  heavywork  involved  in  tank  renovation,  supplementing 
beneficiaries’ work. As a first phase of tank renovation, ten small tanks have 
been renovatcd by NDF in Kuruncgdlii District with the active participation 
of the Farnier organizations. 
Therc were other NGOr involved  in minor irrigation both directly and 
indirectly as a resull of their activities in the broad field of  rural development; 
these have been reviewed at an IlMliARTI jointly sponsored workshop in 
March 1989 (Dayaratne and Wickrdmasinghe 1990).  Howcver, the scale of 
intervcntion by other NGOs in the minor irrigation sector was small in terms 
of area. number of beneficiaries, and investment.  As such, in this study only 
thestrategiesofFFHCandNDFarereviewedindctai1,  inaddition to the three 
major strategies (VIRP. IKDP and ADZAP) developed by the Govcrnmentof x  A  nfimw  OF ALTER.WATIVE  STKATEGIE.S  FOR IMPROVING ~~1.7 
Sri Lanka.  These five strategies are described in the following chapters in 
order of thc magnitude of  their interventions. 
The strategies are presented  with particular  attenlion lo the aspects of 
selection criteria, planning procedure, implementation methodology, fanner 
participation, water management, pro rata (i.e., unit cost), and sustainability. 
Some recommendations are also given in the last chaptcr after comparing the 
strengths and weaknesses of each intervention. CHAPTER 3 
The Village Irrigation Rehabilitation Project 
OF ALL  PVSTINDEPENIXNT state interventions in small irrigation, the Village 
Irrigation Rehahilitation Project (VIRP) was the biggest in terms of its focus 
on village irrigation and water management, the area covered and the cost 
involvcd.  The VIRP strategy is descrihed in Appendix I. Thc location of the 
VlRP project area is givcn in Figurc 2. 
PROJECT IMPLEMENTATION 
Organization 
Like many other blueprint-typc  projects,  VIRP too was  a systematically 
planncd project;  when  it came to implementdlion all thc drawbacks that 
characterize blueprint projects surfaced from the very beginning. 
f:rom  the  orgaiiizalional  point  of  vicw,  the  project-specific  problems 
started when the government introduccd the VlRP rehabilitation procedure 
by means of the cxisting bureaucratic managemcnt. Apart lrom the top-down 
control of the same department, a lack of cooperation between the two major 
implementing agencies, the Irrigation Department and the Department of 
Agrarian Serviccs (DAS), developed as a result of  different responsibilities 
for project implementation.  The Irrigation  Department had  to complete 
upstream development and hand over the systems to DAS for downstream 
dcvelopmenl and water management. The Irrigation Department had to deal 
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with  physical resources  like land and  soil while DAS had  to deal  inore 
precisely with the most dynamic element -  the human resource. The serious 
lack of coordinated project implementation, especially during the first three 
years of the project caused problems when it came to the handing-over phase. 
Thcsc are a few abpects of the VlRP strategy that caused problems or poor 
performance (Medagama 1986). 
These problems were encountered during the four stages of implementa- 
tion: investigation  stage, design stage, constroction  stage and operational 
stage. 
Investigation Stage 
During the investigation stage, the selection of the most deserving tanks was 
problematic as thc dataavailablc  in thc Paddy Lands Rcgistcrs, maintaincd by 
the Agrarian  Services Centers, were often incorrect.  This called for field 
surveys which proved ti1 be difficult.  There were instances where the elite 
managed to include their tanks in the project by  giving the names of their 
relatives as owners even though there were only one or  two owners registered 
in the Paddy Land Register of the area. On the other hand, selection imposed 
from outsidc the community did no1 encourage farmers to come forward with 
theirsuggestions forrehabilitationoftheirtank(AbeyratneandPerera  1986). 
It was therefore essential to give duc recognition to an organized farmer 
community without adhering to a fixed number of farmers in tank selection. 
The approval for the investigated and selected tanks was sought from Ihe 
District Agricultural Committcc. This was very easily given if the local MPs 
were satisfied that their selections were included in the final list. The list was 
then forwarded to thc VIRP Steering Commitlee in Colombo where again a 
formal approval was given. The World Bank Staff Appraisal Report envis- 
aged a meeting of the farmers and officers of  DAS and the Department of 
Agriculture hefore the full survey anddesign preparation, but this was not put 
into practice in the implementation  stage, especially, prior to  1983.  The 
Irrigation Department was always technically oriented and did not seek the 
farmers'views in thcprocessofsurveyinganddesigning which they regarded 
as their area of expertise.  As a result, there were schemes rehabilitated prior 
to 1983 without structures needed for improvcd water management and thus 
these schemes wcrc not taken over by DAS (Medagama 19x6). It was also 11  THE VILUOE IKKlGATION  REllAtlll.lTATlOiv  PRWECI 
Figure 2. 7hr Village Irrigation Rekohilitalion Project of  Sri LUII~CI:  Localion of 
projecl wean. 
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found that not only did the implementing agency responsible for construction 
not hold farmer meetings, but that it was not prepared to change the designs 
according tothe fxiners’ suggestions. This was anoutcome of uncoordinated 
and coinpartmcntalized design planning from the initial stage.  During the 
post- 1983  period. however, this situation gradually changed when the project 
called for more coordinated implementation. 
Construction Stage 
During the construction period, Irrigation Department which was the imple- 
menting agency. had to follow normal government financial regulations and 
award the tcndcr to the lowest bidder, and complete a given numhcr of works 
during a given financial year.  This prcvented the farmers from getting the 
contract for construction even though they needed it.  Furthermore, in most 
ciiscs the contractors did not hire farmers in the tank village for labor work 
which resulted in less involvement ofthcfarmers in supervising the construc- 
tion on  the one hand, and difficulty in getting their participation  in water 
managcment at the operational stage by DAS, on the other (ihid).  It has very 
often been proven that these rules and regulations pertaining to tenders are 
ohsoletc as they were framed during the colonial period.  Thcy should he 
changed to suit the requircmenl of the present community-hased develop- 
ment. 
Operational Stage 
When it came to the operational stage, thc situation was more bureaucratic 
particularly in the matter of handing over the rehabilitated system hy Irriga- 
tion Depdrtmcnt to Department of Agrarian Services for thc implementation 
of  the  Water  Management  Program.  As the  fdrmer communities werc 
excludedfromthisprocess thefarinerscontinued toregard thesysteniasstate- 
owned property.  The serious consequence of this was that farmers lost thc 
much nceded “sense of ownership” for the system and increased the “rate of 
dependency” on the stale for system management.  Therelore, when  UAS 
took over for water management thc hagileelement of community ownership 
was lost and thc expected Water Management Program became difficult to be 
implemented. 'IHHF  'VILLAGE IKI<IGATION REllAllll.lI4U~N  PRO.lECl 
Issues and Problems 
13 
By the end of 1989, Irrigation Department had completed and handed over to 
DAS  somc 985 tanks nut  of  the target of  1,200  under  the rehabilitation 
program which commenced in 1980. The modernization program started in 
I983 and by the end of 1989, DAS had exceeded the target (500 systems) by 
completing 504 schemes.  The Water Management Program was introduced 
to all these systems, but it was opcrational at satisfactory levels only in the 
systems where community participation was sought from the very beginning 
of  the process. Difficultics had  OCCUIT~~  in organizing  farmers for sound 
water management practices in soniecases, especially in thepre-I983 period 
during which Irrigation Department worked in isolation without giving duc 
consideration to the role of beneficiary farmers; this becomes very crucial at 
the later part of thc process when water management is the key  10  system 
sustainability. 
The problems and issues encountered at thc implementation stage could hc 
summarized as follows: 
a)  Noninclusion of  farmers' knowledge and experience in the design process 
has resulted in drawbacks and damaze at the "operatinnal  stage." 
b)  Consequences of tank bed cultivation could havc been avoided if farmers 
had  been  consulted  and  convinced of  the  ill-effects  of  this  type  of 
cultivation from the beginning. 
c)  The daniage done to the hund and downstream structures (control gates, 
firm turnouts,  pipe  outlets)  by  farmers was  the  result  of  their  non- 
participation in the prucess. 
d) Ovcr 60 percenl of  the farmers have claimed there were problems of 
physical  work  aftcr the  rehabilitation  due to  the  fact  that  Irrigation 
Department did  not consult the local residents (Abeyratne and Perera 
19x6). 
c) Most farmers have indicated that they came to know about the rehabilita- 
tion  only after the contractor arrived in  the village to commcnce the 
construction (I-lerath ct at. 1986). 
f)  The downstream earthworks that were to be done by the farmers were 
impeded hy them as they were under the impressioii that the entire work 
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g) When  farmers  were  treated  in  two  contradictory  approaches  in  the 
rchabilitation process (i,e,,  not consulted at all) and in water management 
(i.e., active participation sought) it became impossible to organize them 
in the anticipated manner. 
h)  A tussle between the two implcmenting agencies (Irrigation Department 
and Department of Agrarian Services) with regard to “handing over”and 
“taking over” had not been resolved until thc latter part of the project. The 
World Bank mission of I986 recommended a separate block allocation to 
DAS to rectify the defects and to do the repairs needed after “taking ovcr” 
from Irrigation  Department.  This allocation  was  cffcctively  used  to 
complete the remaining civil works when and where needed. 
Progress of  the Water  Management Program 
The Water Management Program d‘V1RPpIanned the useof rainfall and tank 
water more efficiently than the usual practice:  it planned  thc cxpansion of 
command areas by improving the dependability ofwatersupply and equitable 
allocation  of  water among farmerb.  All  tanks rehabilitated by  Irrigation 
Department and tanks modernized by DAS since 1983 were included in the 
Water Management Program.  There were three components in the Water 
Management Program of  DAS (Medagama 1986): 
Although t.he Agricultural  Planning Team (APT) was designed  to 
implement the Watcr Management Program  in close contact with  the 
farmers, in practice, the farmcrs regarded it as an outside organi7:ation 
sinccthcy werenotrepresented. Inshort,APT, tothcfarmers, wasagroup 
of  government officials  who pcrfornied their duties for “goveriiment- 
owned irrigation systems.” 
The Farmer Representativc  who replaced the ,:el-vidone  (Irrigation 
Headman)  was supposed to play a vital role in the Water Management 
Program which included operation of sluices, supervision of water deliv- 
eries, collection  of. daily  rainfall  data, and chairmanship of  the  tank 
committee.  In most cases, however. there was a vicious circle where the 
Farmcr Representatives  did  not  perform  as expected  resulting  in  the 
farniers’ relucvance to pay the due remuneration to the Farmer Rcpresenta- 
tives which in turn resulted in the dctcrioration of the latter’s enthusiasm 
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Representatives’  functions was thc introduction of  the Cultivation Officer 
who was assigned to implement the Water Management Program under 
small irrigation schemes and who became the official agent of DAS at the, 
village level. The Cultivation Officer has the legal right to  act against the 
farmers who violate government rules and regulations and to resolve their 
conflicts. Therefore, in practice, the position of Fanner Reprcsentatives 
in the overall Water Management Program has been undermined by other 
positions introduced into the existing hierarchy of the government (ihid). 
The other important institution estahlished for the Water Manage- 
mcnt Progrim by VIRP is the “tank committee”consisting of village-level 
government officials (Cultivation Officer, KVS’. Divisional Officer) and 
a fcw farmer representatives, including the Farmer Representative and the 
group leaders who represent the tracts of the command area of a tank. The 
Farmer Representative is the chairman ofthe tank committee. At the tank 
committee meeting the formulated Water Management Program is pre- 
sented for formal approval. Issues in regard to dates of maintenance work 
on the hund and channel system. clearing the scrub jungle, the cultivation 
calendar, and the water rotations are discussed and decisions made on 
corrective measures. 
The study conducted by  the Agrarian  Research  and Training Institute 
(ARTI) discovered four major  issues  regarding  the  concept  of  the  tank 
community  (Abeyrdtne  1986, Medagalna  1986).  lhey are summariLed 
below. 
a)  The “one tank - one village” concept on which the tank? committee was 
basedisnoloiigerrelevantwithstatepenetrationtotheruralalPasand  with 
many other changes including demographic changes, resulting in very 
low functionality of  the committee. 
h)  The very high investments of various sorts in village irrigation scheme.s 
havc resulted in a,-eduction in the farmers’senseofownershipof the tank. 
According tofhcART1  study.67pcrcentofthe farmersconsidered thatthc 
state owned the scheme; this attitude was an obvious outcome when the 
farmers were  not involved  in  the process  from  preconstrliction stage 
~  ~-  ~~~  ~- 
‘Agricuhural exleilsiun officer at the field level. 
?To  facilitate the Water Maoagement Program, the command area 01  3  lank is 
divided into a fcw tracts. and groups are foirncd to represrnl each fract. 
i 
I 
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through construction  stage.  They were often reluctant to  form a tank 
committee prior to rehabilitation. 
c)  Because of population pressure and land fragmentation in the villages 
farmers were compelled to look for  alternatives likccultivatingcashcrops 
and doing nonfarm activities for income. Therefore, the functional utility 
and social validity of instituting a tank committee were questionable. Ricc 
cullivation under the tank was rarely a full-time endeavor. 
d)  Some potential  users  of  the  tank  were  not  represented  on  the  tank 
committee simply because they did not own land under the system; for 
example, a considerable number of families living around some tanks 
depended upon fishing in the tank.  Resolving conflicts over water wds 
difficult if all such beneficiaries were not represented. 
Though state penetration for rural devclopment seemed to he very high 
throughVIRP, itwasverylowin  thecaseoftankcommitteesas thelatterwere 
not backed by legal provisions; this is another reason For  their sustainability 
to be questioned. 
THE DECREE OF SUCCESS 
The Staff Appraisal  Report (World Rank  1980) had  made provision  for 
project  evaluations  but  this component has not been  sufficiently covered 
except for the ART1 study carried out on behalf of VIRP and a few studies on 
selccted locations to fulfill other rescarch interests. Under evaluation studies, 
an allocation of IJSS197,12S  (Rs 5.9 million) has been made for a physical 
resources  evaluation  study, a socioeconomic evaluation  study, and other 
studies.  These financial  resources  have not been  used  for a systematic 
evaluation which  should cover performance evaluation  as well as impact 
evaluation. 
The field-level iiivestigations done by DAS and the ART1 sludy on VIRP, 
however, revealed several facts which could hc  tredted as some sort of  impact 
evaluation.  These facls arc summarized below in the order of their impor- 
I. The Carmers' involvement in the rehabilitation and management process 
of VIRP has not been very successful.  The project has been justified by 
theneed forrehabilitation; huta highrateofsuccesscouldnot  beachieved 
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when 90 perccnt of  the landholdings  were  helow  0.4 ha  (I acre) and 
farmers did subsistence agriculture. 
2.  Thc state claimed the village irrigation systems were virtually farmer- 
managed systems, hut the farmers' attitude toward irrigation schemes as 
well  as other physical  infrastructurc  was  quite  the  opposite.  They 
expected almost every service including irrigation system improvement 
and management, education,  health, agricultural input, and food subsidies 
from external agencies. 
3.  The Water Management Program of DAS has proven somewhal success- 
ful as 63 percent of thcfarmers under VIRP have indicated that their water 
supply had improved after the introduction of the program. ill spite of the 
fact Ihat  the Water Management Program  was  implemented  through 
bureaucratic institutions. 
4.  Because rural courts have been aholished conflicts among farmers over 
water use and system managemcnt had to be resolved by external agencies 
like the agent ofDAS (the  Cultivation Officer) whose service was sought 
by farmers toovercomethe problems ofwaterallocation,  distrihution, and 
violation of irrigation rules; the rolc oCCultivation Officer has developed 
in parallel to the implemcnlation of the Water Management Program of 
VIRP. 
5.  The Water Management Program of VlRP achieved a high degree of 
success in terms of  availability and adequacy of water as the number of 
farmcrsreporting watershortageininahahashecnreducedby  three tofour 
times. A study has been done on these aspects by thc University  of Sri 
Lanka (Herath et al.  1986). 
6.  The number of farmers reporting bad channel maintenancc and illegal 
water tapping has declined considerably 'indicating an improved watcr 
management practicc under rehabilitated tanks. 
Furtherstudics will have to he donc on overall performance and impact of 
VlRP in order to identify thc weaknesses and strengths of the project before 
it is  replicated  elscwhere.  The National  Irrigation Rehabilitation  Project 
(NIRP) which  includes medium-scale  schemes as well, is currently under 
formulation as phase-I1 of VIRP.  Lessons of VlRP should he learnt by in- 
depth studies in the abovementioned areas before the NIRP's  implementa- 
tion. One such attempt was made by IIMI to look at the aspects of state policy 
and practice in a study carried out in two VlRP systems in Ratnapura District 
(Abeyratne 19x9). CHAPTER 4 
Integrated Rural Development Programs 
INTRODUCTION 
IN SRI  LANKA,  the deccntralization of development effons started in the early 
1970s and culminated with the introduction of the Integrated Rural Devclop- 
ment Programs (IRDPs) at district level in the late 1970s.  The IRDPs were 
initiated in ordertochannel resources into thosedistricts which did not benefit 
from themajor national developmcntel‘fortsunder  theMahaweli Projcct. The 
IRDPs wereoriginallyplannedforthree districts in 1979,  namely Kurunegala, 
Hambantota aud Matara.  They were subsequently extended to the dry zone, 
and have covered 14 districts by 1988 (see Figure 3). 
The district IRDPs represent a renewed emphasis on the developmcnt of 
the rural areas to improve the conditions of the rural population.  Even more 
importantly “it represcnts a new approach to accelerating the development of 
the rural scctor”according to the Director ofRegional Development Division 
of the fonner Ministry of Plan Implementation (Pcrera 1982). 
The conceptual and theoretical  aspects of  this strategy have not  been 
formallydiscussed.evaluated,oracccptedat  theinceptionofthe  IRDPs. The 
basis of this strategy was created by several governing ideas which follow: 
a)  The broad and general objective of IRDPs was to improve the income, the 
ernploymcnl and the general standard of living of the rural population. 
b)  The level of investments and planning activities were to he replicablc so 
that in course of time all eligible districts should have similar projects. 
c) The IRDPs would be implemented in predominantly  rural districts not 
servcd by the Mdhaweli projects. 
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d) No special authority was to he created for implementing. executing or 
managing the planned activities:  the existing governmental  apparatus 
was to be  used. 
e)  Greater attention was to be paid to the more backward areas within the 
district. 
f)  The project activities were to  be carefully selected taking into considera- 
tion the main economic problems and potential of the district. 
g)  A short-term and medium-term outlook were to be adopted, particular 
attention being directed at eliminatiiig bottlenecks in the service-delivery 
systems and the production patterns. 
h)  Project activities would be incremental to the other ongoing and planned 
development measures undertaken under existing programs. 
i)  The project activities wcre to be less capital-intensive in nature. 
j)  Maximum flexibility in the choice ofproject activities was to be allowed 
for  taking  into consideration  the district-specific  rural  needs and the 
planning prcicedure. 
Significantly, the idea embodied in the last item peimitted maximum 
freedom  for  the  district-level  planners  to  use  their  best  initiatives  and 
capacities in the planning and implementation of  projects within the district 
(Perera 19x5). 
Different approaches havc been adopted in the planning and implemen- 
tation of the IRDPs indiffereirtdistricts. indicating the preferenceofthedonor 
agencies and the government’s tlexihilily  in dealing with those agencies. 
Based on this diversity of approaches three major IRDP “models” have been 
identified. Thc first is the blueprint or program-approach model of the World 
Bank funded prqiects; thc second is the fixed sectoral subproject (rollingplan) 
model, and the third is the annual program model. The last two models are 
connected to bilateral donors. The first is depicted as setting out a clear plan 
of operation over a fixed period of five years at the outset with only minor 
modifications subsequently.  The latter two models take  an  instrumental 
approach adapting to  experience and new  initiatives (Rao el al.  1983 and 
Perera  1982).  These different  ~iodcls  are mainly the  result of  different 
working procedures of  the funding agencies, rather than of  any deliberate 
choice depending on the appropriatcness  of any model to  any particular 
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Starting from Kurunegala District the World Bank’s blueprint approach 
has heen extended to other districts like Matale, Puttalam, Badidla? Vavuniya 
and Mannar.  The subproject (rolling) model evolved from thc Norwegian 
Agency fnr Development Cooperation (NOR AD) aided Hambanlola District 
IRDP and then it was extended LO Moncragala IRDP.  The annual program 
model evolved from the Swedish International Development Agency (SIDA) 
aided MataraIRDPand was subsequently extended tothe Netherlands funded 
Nuwara-Eliya IRDP and Ratnapura IRDP. 
IRRIGATION PROJECTS OF IRDPS 
Whilst VIRP is a district-level project mcilnt solely for irrigation develop- 
ment, IRDPs arc district-level program under which different scctors have 
been identified as projects. Irrigation is onc such sectoral project within the 
bmad framework of rural development. These programs are defined by thc 
World  Bank as District Rural  Dcvclopment Programs dropping the word 
“intcgratcd“  while all the other programs are called IRDPs anticipating a 
certain degree of “intcgration” among sectors and activitieb of the overall 
program. 
Irrigation is, thus, one of the sectoral projects or subprojects of IRDPs 
which usuallyconrain 12-15  subprojects. Inmost IRDPs thc irrigation sector 
ih the higgcst in terms of annual allocation of funds, the number of schemes 
and the area covered, and the activitics involved. 
It is noteworthy that IRDPs which include an irrigation component havc 
given high priorily to minor irrigation or farmer-managed irrigation systems. 
All  of  the World  Bank  funded  IRDPs are located  in the  Northwest,  the 
Northern and Central provinces of thc country.  Since 1984, owing to civil 
disturbances, work  in IRDPs  in Vavuniya and Mannar districts was sus- 
pended temporarily.  The strategy adopted by  the World  Bank for minor 
irrigalion development was more or less similar to that of  VIRP. 
‘Thc Badulla IRDP is funded by the International Fund for Agricultural Develop- 
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The other two types of models have a more flexible approach and have 
developed a strategy particularly in the minor irrigation sector following a 
package program within the subproject. 
For the sake of better understanding and comparison of the strategy of 
IRDPs with regard to ininor irrigation intervention, two district IRDPs were 
included in this study: one was the World Bank funded KurunegalalRDP and 
the other was the NORAD funded Hambantota IRDP.  Particular references 
are made to these two district IRDPs which are representative of the others, 
while nther district IRDPs will also be referred to wherever applicable. 
THE KURUNEGALA IRDP 
The differencc between VIRP and thc World Bank funded IRDP is that the 
former is a minor irrigation rehdhilitation project covering 14 districts while 
the lalter has a minor irrigation component among its other physical, eco- 
nomic and social development cnmponents.  The World Bank strategy in 
Kurunegala IRDP is described in the Staff Appraisal Report (World Bank 
I97X), and “Village Irrigation Schemes” is a subcomponeni of the irrigation 
and Watcr Management Prnject which includes major irrigation and water 
management components as well. 
Project Planning and Implementation 
After identificatioii of the project components, detailed surveys, investiga- 
tions and estimates for tanks and anicut were carried out by  the Irrigation 
Departmcnl which is the inipleinentirigagencyfcirthecivil  worksofthc whole 
irrigation and Watcr Management Program.  At the time of  the World Bank 
staffappraisal some 130villageirrigation schemes  had been identified and the 
rest of the schemes was selected in B phased manner during the initial years 
of  the project implementation. 
There were only a few sources of information about village irrigation 
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zations, lists forwarded by politicians (Members of Parliament), and lists of 
investigated  schemes prepared by  technical agencies.  As the number of 
schemes and investment for each electorate on village irrigation rehabilitation 
had tobe equallydistributedduring  the first selection period, some difficulties 
occurred  in  terms of  selecting  the  most  deserving  schemes in  thc  most 
backward areas.  Thc selection criteria drawn up, however, constituted the 
deciding factor which prevented very  mall and nonfeasible schemes from 
getting  selected.  More village tanks were selected from the western  and 
northern  dry-zone clectorates  of  the  district  while  anicut  schemes were 
selected from the intermediate  zone of  [he southern and eastern areas of 
Kurunegala District. 
Almost all of  the village irrigation schemcs wcre working schemes or 
schemes very recently neglected and in a state of disrepair. Thus. completely 
abandoncd schcnics wcrc not refurbished under the project but improvements 
were made to the existing bunds, sluices, spillways, channel systems, and 
their distributary structures in the case of tanks and to thc sluices, spillway 
structures, and overflow structures in the case of anicuts.  The rehabilitation 
work involved small to large repairs to the different components of existing 
tanks and anicuts rather than  thc restoration of anciently neglected tanks 
which needed complete reconstruction.  As such, there were fanners already 
owning land in thcsc tank areas and land alienation or resettlement problems 
did not occur in the process of village irrigation rehabilitation ofthc Kurunegala 
Integrated Rural Development Program. 
The Irrigation Department was the sole authority for  investigation, detailed 
survey, and improvements to the headworks of the schemes. Implementation 
of the Water Management Program including the special improvements to 
downstream structures was the responsibility of the Department of Agrarian 
Services. Both departments were given machinery and equipment needed for 
the rehabilitation and for the Water Management Program. 
Project Management 
All IRDPs in the country were implemented under the auspices of the then 
Ministry of Plan Implementation (presently the Ministry of  Policy Planning 
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coordinated the program at the national level and its district-level project 
office coordinated the entire process of the program at the district level. 
At  the  end of  1988, i.e..  after  10 years’  implementation,  the project 
activities of the Kurunegala IKDP were completed?  During this period the 
project was reviewed periodically by the District Coordinating Committee in 
which all thc heads of the implementing agencies, the Govcminent Agent, the 
Project Director and politicians wcrr represented.  At the District Coordinat- 
ing Committcc,  progress ofthe  different projects was reviewed, problems and 
issues discussed and remedial measures taken: the issues beyond the purview 
of the District Coordinating Committee were directed to the National Coor- 
dinating Committee which comprised heads of the national agencies.  The 
National Coordinating Committee meetings were held annually or hiannu- 
ally. For the implcrnentation of irrigation subprojects Irrigation Department 
and Department of  Agrarian Services were equally important. 
Progress of the Project 
Out of the planned 500 village irrigation schemes 453 were completed by thc 
end  of  1987  with  a  total  expenditure of  approximately  US$3.7  million 
(Ks I10.8million). Aain theV1KPsclieinesthere weredefects inconstruction 
during the initial years of the project.  The construction work was monitored 
and revised by the Project Office and the World Bank periodically, and the 
quality of the constructioii work iniproved over the years. 
The“handii1g over”ofcomp1eted works by Irrigation Department and the 
“takingover”oCthem by DAS created some problems in regard to the project- 
specific items involved in the Water Management Program during the initial 
years. For the same reasondescribed in the lastchapter underVIKP, the Water 
Management Program was affecred hy misunderstanding, lack of  coordina- 
tion between Irrigation Department and Department of Agrarian  Services, 
noninvolvement of farmers from the inception of the program and hureau- 
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the sole authority for implementing the Water Management Program, and it 
has developed its program using the Agricultural Planning Tcdm effectively 
since 19x3 in parallel with VlRP (Meddgama 1986). 
According to the project management of the Kurunegala IRDP, the Water 
Management Program could not be implemented successfully in all the tank 
areas owing to technical and social reasons, but all in all DAS managed to 
cover around 60 percent of thc rehabilitated schemes in implementing thc 
Water Management Program. 
As one may expect, sectoral development initiated by  the Kurunegala 
IRDP showed its own problems since this program was the first of its kind in 
theislandanditl.ook timeforthe staff involved tosuccessfully implcment the 
targeted activities. It was also highlighted that additional staff needed for the 
implementation oi  thc Water Management Program could not be recruited 
immediately in the early period and the staff naturally took  time to adapt 
themselvcs to the new  setup as they followed the process of  “learning by 
doing.”  It  was  observed  that  the  absence  of  an  effective  mechanism, 
particularly during the early years ofthe project, toaccommodate the farmers’ 
needs as rcgards the design and implementation of the minor tank rehabili- 
tation component was a deilciency (Sepdla Asoka et al. 19XX). 
The  village irrigation scheme subcomponent of the Kurunegala IRDP was 
replicated  in other World Bank  funded programs like those in Matale and 
Puttalam and the lessons learnt in Kurunegala were applied to these IRDPs. 
These latterprograms initiatedtheir activities in 19x1 with sufficient yearsol‘ 
experience from the first IRDP. 
The visual socioeconomic impact of the project was the increased area 
taken under cultivation: under most of the tank areas the command area has 
been increased at lcast by I0 percent while the cultivated acreage (in most of 
the schemes) has been increased by 50-100 percent according to the progress 
reports.i 
sKuruncgala IRDI’  Progrcss Rcpon submitted to the Ministry of Plan Implementa- 
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THE HAMBANTOTA IRDP 
The Hambantota District Integrated Rural Development Program (HIRDP) 
was the first IRDP that evolvcd lhemodel of self-planning  or planning below 
the national level.  “The program aims at achieving an increase to income, 
employment, and production as wcll as improvement of social conditions and 
living standards of the men, women and children of the Hambantota District, 
with  special emphasis on the poorest groups” (Main agreement between 
NORAD and the Government of Sri Lanka - 1979). 
The strategy to achieve its objectives was also given in the agreement: 
*  An  integrated approach, whereby efforts within various fields are 
related to each other. 
*  A method of  recurrent planning whereby information from ongoing 
activities is continuously fed into a revolving planning procedure. 
*  A method ofcoocer~~ed  participation of  the population of both sexes 
in a dccentralized planning and implementation process. 
This strategy was quite different from the World Bank’s blueprint.  The 
rolling planning strategy at the district level was highly encouraged. though 
details of this concept are not stated in thc agreement. The need to strcngthen 
the district administration regarding planning implementation, monitoring, 
and evaluation of development efforts was however stressed.  The project 
proposals werc prepared at the district lcvel and each proposal was agreed 
uponby NORADandtheMinislryofPlanImplementation.  This wasavariant 
of  other IRDPs funded by multilateral as well as bilateral donors. An annual 
project meeting was held to review the development of the program. There 
was a clear emphasis on an annual cycle of events with annual planning. 
Planning and Implementation of Irrigation Projects 
At the inception of HIRDP in  1979, several subprojects were identified in 
haste for immediate implementation.  The irrigation component was one of 
the first projects identified, planned, and implemented.  Over a third of the 
total investment of  HlRDPduring the first and second five-yearperiods ofthe 
program  was on irrigation work.  Three different activities took place  in 
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a)  The rehabilitation of  Kirama Oya diversion  scheme consisting  of 20 
aiiicut schemes (weirs). 
b)  The establishment of settlement clusters under the rehabilitation tanks in 
the eastern part of  the district on a package program which included the 
development of  all the physical, cconomic. and social components. 
c) The rehabilitation of village tanks in the western part of the district. 
The Kiraina  Oya scheme as a whole  was a major  irrigation  scheme 
covering over 1,200 ha (3.000 acres) hut the individual anicut schemes were 
operated by farmers, showing all theelements of a farmer-managed irrigation 
system.  The project assisted rehabilitation or the sluices, spills and channel 
system, and distributary  structures of  each anicut  system resulting  in  an 
increase in the cultivated and harvested area in both maha and yala. Because, 
at the macro level the inanageinent of the Kirama Oya system was done by the 
Irrigation Department and at the micro level or the individual anicut level 
lhrmcrs managed  thc system, this scheme is a good example of  a jointly 
managed irrigation system.  During the first few years of  implcmcntatii~n, 
defects in the project design began to emerge as a result of planning without 
sufficient investigation and so on.  Subsequently, the project was supplc- 
mented by otherphysical components as well as water management andcredit 
programs.  The experiences gained  under the Kirama  Oya scheme were 
extensively uscd forplanningofthc  Uruboku Oyascheme which was asimilar 
diversion scheme. but which took more than six years for detailed investiga- 
tion and planning alone. 
The settlemeiitclustcrs in therchahilitated tankareasconstitutedapro.ject 
evolved lhrough HIKDP’s own “learning by doing” process as an outcome of 
the original project titled “Rehabilitation of  87 Tanks in the District.” The 
restoration of abandoned tanks in the eastern part of the district involved a 
series of mutually dependent components, because the earmarked tanks were 
not working tanks and were located amidst extensively cheiiud (swidden) 
areas. The  main components of  the settlement projects were irrigation works, 
land devclopmcnt. re-afforestation, housing and other facilities. domestic 
water supply, production support, and social infrastructure (education and 
health).  With the rcstoration of each tank  under seltlemenl clusters, land 
allotments of 0.8 ha (2 acres) of rice land and 0.4 ha (I  acre) of highland were 
alienated to the settlers.  With the gradual resettlement of the farm families, 
other facilities had to be provided under a package program which included 
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Starting from 1980, three settlement clusters consisting of 18 tanks and 
one medium-si7.e settlement were established. These clusters were located in 
the Assistant Government Agent divisions ofbmbantota and Tissamaharama 
(prescntly in three divisions) where chenacultivation was the dominant land- 
use practice. Underthese three clusters, namely Mattala(7 tanks), Weliwewa 
(6 tanks),  and Gonnoruwa (5 tanks) and  under Maha-Aluthgam-ara  tank 
settlement, some 1,385 families became settled permanent farmers, owning 
960  ha (2,370 acres). This  project was identified, formulated, and implemented 
by  the district-based planning staff showing a great amount of  flexibility. 
There  was  adequate  opportunity to  include  additional components or to 
exclude unnecessary items hom the original project proposal depending on 
the implementation experience and suggestions made by the famiers.  The 
latter clusters were actually planned taking into consideration the ideas ofthe 
prospective hcneficiaries.  However, at the inception of  this program there 
was no opportunity to consult farmers since they were yet to be selected. 
Instead, views ofthe  farmers of the ncighborhood were used and settling of 
farmers prior to and along with the rehabilitation was encouraged as far as 
possible. However, the weaknesses of the project implementation during the 
early years were later removed based on periodic reviews conducted jointly 
by NORAD andthe HIRDPoffice (Prestgard and Dayaratne 1983; Dayananda 
and Ha7andcen 1984; Dayananda and Karunaratne 1986). 
Rchabilitation of villagc tanks in the western part of the district involved 
improvements to working  tanks (strengthening  the bund, repairs and im- 
provements to sluices, spillway andchannel systems). Over 40 village tanks 
were rehabilitated under this program and project activities were identified, 
organized and arranged with thc active participation of farmer organizations. 
particularly during the second and third phases of  the subproject. 
Supplementary agricultural programs, namely, water management, agri- 
cultural  credit  and  crop cultivation, were  incorporatcd  into all  of  thcse 
irrigation subprojects. In the settlement clusters, the organization of  farmers 
for receiving the intended benefits from the project was sought through the 
involvement of "Sarvodaya" which is the biggest national nongovernment 
organization in Sri Lanka.  It has carried out cultural and spiritual develop- 
ment of farm families for better functioning of the irrigation-cum-settlcment 
systemsinall thrceclusterssince 19KI. lkeexperiencesgainedby thisNGO 
assistance in improving the management of small-scale irrigation ~cliemes 
under  settlement clusters  were  reviewed  by  a  recent  IlMl  study  (Ingc 30  A nwmv  01.  AI.IMWATIVE  STRATEGIES  FOR  IMPROVING  1;~i.s 
Jungeling 19x9). At the latterpart ofthe project, however, Sarvodaya became 
another "contrictor"  rather  than  a catalyst, involving  itself  in  physical 
construction work (rural roads, channels, etc.) thereby deviating from the 
community development work it was supposed to attend to. 
Project munugement was done by the project officeldistrictplanning unit, 
which was responsible for overall planning, implementing. and monitoringof 
lhe project.  Apart from the District Coordination Committee. the project 
office developed a subcommittee forminor  irrigation rehabilitation todiscuss 
and review its progress.  Staff from Irrigation Department, DAS and the 
agencies involved in community development of the minor irrigation based 
villages and settlements participated in thcsc meetings.  Many implementa- 
tion and managementproblems were solvedthrough these committee meetings. 
Further, NORAD, the l'unding  agency, also used  to  review the irrigation 
subproject hiannually through a group of  local andlor foreign consultants 
resulting in more improvements supplemented into the prqject periodically. 
For example, new schools and hcalth facilities were provided to tank-based 
settlements as a response to a request made by fanners to the review tcam in 
1984 (Dayananda and Hazandeen 1984). 
The strategy adoptcd [or the tank-based settlement has been regarded as 
the  first breakthrough  of  HIRDP's  development planning  methodology. 
which during recent years, (1985 onwards) was effectively used for more 
local-level planning under IRDPs. 
THE DEGREE OF SUCCESS 
The main contrast belween the IRDP and the VlRP approaches is that minor 
irrigation rehabilitation  undcr the [ormer  is one component of  a program 
having several development components while the latter is solely meant for 
rehabilitation and watcr management without going intoother socioeconomic 
prohlcms of the village communities.  A project like VIRP covers several 
districts; the district is the lowest administrative unit directly managed by  a 
centrally controlled department.  In an IRDP, project management is more 
decentralized and  it operates from the district downward, and the  IRDP 
strategy has developed more local-level planning entities like thcP~-udi,shiya /Nil  (,If  111.~11  Niil< 11.  I)lI'I.'l.OI'Nl~NI  I'iilJiil~  l,U\  .i  / 
Suhhu (Assislaiit Government Agent division Icvcl), Gi~uni~xlu,vu  M~indirlu 
(lowest administrative division level), and village-level voluntary organiza- 
tions  aiming  at beneficiary participation.  Farmer organizations become 
cult to establish wlicn tlie pro,ject management liiis  not penetrated into the 
grahs-roots level.  The IRDP minix irrigatiwi project as  a whole liiis diowii 
success cciniparcd to otliei. state interveiitioiis. 
All IRDPs, particularly those in  the dry-zone dirtricts. liilvc iinplemented 
irrieiition-ciiin-water manngcincnt prograins covering about 2.00l1 t;mks ;ind 
anicut scheme5 benefiting :it  Ieiist 40,000 ha  ( I  Ol).OOO  acre\) and 10,000 fill-in 
familie\.  This figiirc  is cmiparable to VIRP's  1,200 scheme,  in thc  14 
districts. 
It  ih also noteworthy Ihnl  ;illlinugh tlie implementing ;igencies fhrmanagc- 
village irrigation sy\teins are tlie same (i.c., Irrigation Depart- 
nient and DAS),  aspects of impleincntiitiiin, monitoring and progres\ control 
are more wccessfiil in the case of IKDt'h  tliaii of VIRP. due prob:ibly  to  the 
fact  thal IKDPs are managed by ii  se  e Government  Ministry with ii 
regular incchaiiism (if reporting at iill I  of iniplement;ition,  while VlRP 
is  only niiinagcd by 21  iietional-level VlRP  coordinating uiiiiiiiittcc which i!, 
also housed in tlic  DAS licadquiirters: iurtliermorc, the coordiiiatioii,  both 
vcrtically and horizontally (at district level). lias m;idc tlic htrntegy of IKDPs 
more efficient tliaii that of VIRP. This cflcctive coordination and integration 
with othei-ngcncics is  Iiighlighted in a review done in  Hiimhantiita (Whist el 
al. 1984). CHAPTER 5 
The Anuradhapura Dry-Zone Agriculture Project 
INTRODUCTION 
Tiii:. AxiiRAoiiAPuRA  oKY-mw Agriculture Project (ADZAP) was essentially 
ii rural development project in Anuradhapura District, the largest district of 
Sri Lanka, and its main objective was to raise food production and increase 
the incomes of about 4,000 IandleTs families practicing cultivation through 
the establishment of  a  viable  system of  combined  rain-fcd and  irrigated 
fanning integrated with  livestock develnpmcnt.  The target  families wcre 
expected to hc permanently settled and given Inndownership rights. 
The original project idcntifiication was done in 1978 by an agricultural 
scctor project identification mission from the FA0  Investment Center.  The 
Agricultural  Financc Corporation  of India  under  the Asian  Dcvelopinent 
Bank technicalassistancecarriedoutthcfeasibilitystudiesofthi\pl-ojectand 
the detailed project proposal w;is completed in early 19x0;  this waiapproved 
at the end of 1980. The implcmentation of ADZAP commenced in June 198 I. 
Originally, the project was scheduled to he completed by the end nf February 
1987. This period was later extended tn mid-I989 (Project Review Mission 
1986). 
During the initial years there wcre persistent problems in project imple- 
mentation which included inadequate budgetary appropriations and the lack 
ofcoordination between the implementing line agencies. As such, the project 
was refmmulated in Novemher 1984  by limiting its scope and financing. The 
ADZAP was funded hy the Asian Development Bank (ADB), the Interna- 
tional Fund for  Agricultural Developmcnt(lFAD),  and theGovernmentofSri 34  ilO17l<Gii~,S  !.'OK  IMI'I?(JIiN(i  /.'MIS 
Lanka. The total prqject cost wasestimated at US$20million  (Rs 610 million) 
in 19x2. 
The ADZAP has bcen thoroughly rcvicwcd, studicd and coinmcntcd on 
by various agents including foreign missions,  local research organizations 
like ART1 and IIMI, and by individual researchers and scholars. In  addition, 
ART1 organized  a  two-day  workshop  on  AOLAP in April  1989 which 
extcnsivcly rcvicwcd  all its aspects mil came out with certain recommenda- 
tioils.  lIMl conducted a special rapid-iissessrnent survey of  ADLAP  during 
the latterhalfof 1988 andproduceditsreportin April 19x9; this was published 
as an llMl  Working Papcr (Ekanayakc ct al.  1990). In this rapid-assessment 
survey, IlMl particularly looked  at the irrigation  component olthc project  and 
genenilly reviewed other aspects like upland developriirnt and status of  the 
settlement. 
The ADZAP strategy in term  of its irrigation-cutn-water management 
compiincnt is rcvicwed in this chapter based on  the findings of  the above- 
mentioned survey5 and studies.  'The whole ADZAP stratrgy is summarized 
in Appendix 3. 
PRO.JECT  PLANNING AND IMPLEMENTATION 
According ID  lhc reformulation 01 thc project in 1986, ADZAP was  scaled 
down both in  scope and in  Cinancing, bul the concept and objectives iif thc 
pmject were allowed to reinitin intact.  The IFAD  share of financing was 
reduced from US%  14.5 to llSS7.8 niillioii. Theinain adjustments made to the 
scope orthe project were: a) decreasing the numberoftanksfrom 600 to 138: 
bj  reducing the command area development from 8,100 ha (20,000 acres) ti) 
1,620  ha(4.000acres)and uplanddevelopmentfroin27.93S  ha(69,000acres) 
to 4,860 ha (12.000 aci-esj with a correspiinding reduction in thc numbcr of 
chcna cultivalor seulers from 10,000  to4.000;  c)  increasing the investments 
for development of  command areas and adjacent uplands: tl) decreasing the 
credit component from US$S.S to  US%l.X million commensurate with the 
revised  tai-get  of4,00() scttlcrfamilics: and c)  cxtcnding thc lotin  period  by two 
ycars up to 30 June 19x9 in  accordance with the project extension. Construction Stage 
The Irrigation Department  was responsible for construction of headworks 
including the main canal leading from the sluice, but in several cases it did not 
construct thc main canal; the Department of Agrarian Services was left to 
\boulder  that  responsihility.  In contrast, the  Irrigation  Department  cow 
slructedfieldchanncls  in someothercases inaddition to themaincanal which 
work  was something beyond  their responsibility.  Where the downstream 
devcliipmenr  was  the  responsibility  of  DAS, the  development  works  11f 
certain tanks wcrc supposed to be undertaken by the farmers. During the first 
years of the project, farmers were given the option of clearing their own land 
and receiving payment froin the project, or of  asking the prqject's contlactor 
for the schcnre to do the clearing; bul farmers were not consulted about this 
dun-ing the latter part iifthc project (i.e..  since 1986). The explanation given 
was thatthey tooka longerlinietocoinplete  workandtliatsomeofthcleveling 
work needed machinery. 
Sincc the upstream development works were carried out by the Irrigation 
Depiir-cnient prior la  the sclcction of  settlers. the labor of the latter was not 
used, although residents (chena farmers) of the surrounding area wcrc often 
hired as laborers who became project beneficiaries later on. However, during 
the ciinstruction period.  prospective settlers wcrc not certain whether they 
would be sclccted as a result of thc long-time gap hetwccn the construction 
and a~tual  settlement ofthc beneficiaries. Upstrcam development undertaken 
by  the  Irrigatiiin  Department  was a relatively  easy  task  as physicd  im- 
provemcnts to the build, sluicc, spill. and miin  cmd  were, in tnostcilses, done 
witli~ut  involving the bcncliciaries.  According lo  the llMl rapid-assessment 
survey findings, all lhc tanks renovated had improvements to bund. sluice and 
spill; some 3X  percent of  the tiinks  had  improvements to  all  components 
including the entire length of the main canal; and 21 pcrcent of  the tanks got 
all thc components plus field channel outlet structures as well (Ekanayake et 
al. 1990). 
Althiiugh a set ofselection criteria for both tanks and settlers was nvailahlc 
it was  not  sti-ictly adhered to  during the implementation  period.  In tank 
selection, the first method  was for the Project Management Office to ayk 
officers of the Department of Agrarian Services to report on abandoned tanks 
suitable hr  restoration during the early stage (if the project.  Usually, the Cultivation Officer was the informant in  this regard.  He  setit the information 
on tankssuitahlefi,rrenovationmostlyinconsultation  with  farmer  sin  thearea 
andsometimes on hisown initiative. The  ondmcthod of selection was for 
a group of  chena farmers primarily based around an abandoned tank 10  send 
a request through a political leader, the Rural Development Society or the 
local branch  (ilthc political party, to he forwarded to the Project Management 
Office.  The Irrigation Department cent the preliminary list of tanks to the 
ADZAP  office and it  was Sound that irrigation officials too were rcsponsihlc 
for selecting tanks in  B few cascs, whilc the fammers, in  mostcases, lobbied for 
rehabilitation of working tanks rather than the development 01 an ahandoncd 
tank.  According to IIMl’s survey. over two thirds of  the tanks were selected 
on requests made through the Rural Development Societies (Ekanayake ct al. 
IWOj. 
Settler selection,  as  described  earlier  was  carricd out  atier  upstream 
developineiit of the tanks.  The farm families of  the area were notified ola 
“land kwhdiwi  ”  (gazetted meeting) to be held for one tank or several tanks 
togetlrcr.  At the land kachcheri, officers  from the Land Commissioner’s 
Department and Project Management Office interviewed tlie applicants for 
selection.  Although  the  set  criteria  comprised  tlie  basic  requirements, 
political  affiliation was alsoan  implicitcriterion. More  than athird  of  selected 
settlers however, were prior  cultivator^ in the area and in  the thrrluiiu (tank- 
hcd): ahout  14  percent of the settlers selected by the land kachcheri were 
partly replaced by political selectees, and 29  percent of  the scttlcrs were 
selected hy  the land kachcheri based purely on the set criteria (Ekanayake  et 
al. IYYO). 
A discrepancy  thal occurred duiing the implenienlation period was  thc 
inequity in  tlie distribution of  allotments, owing to the absence of  a clear-cut 
procedure. A Sew  examples of this serious drawback are: a) there were more 
prior residents than could be accommodated under the new scheme in  a few 
cases (sorne seleclees were allotted only upland arcs\ in such cases); h) the 
size of upland allotments was reduced from I  .2 ha (3 acres) to 0.8 ha (2  acres) 
to acc~~mmodatcirll  farmers who claimed prior  cultivation  and residence: and 
c) in one surveyed tank ti little over half of the settlers were given norinal 
allotmcnts whilc the rest wcrcgivcn 0.8 ha(2acrcs) of upland alli~tmcntsonly. 
The people without allotments in  tlie command area were not considered as 
“projectpeople”resulting in  their not  heingcntitlcd tocrcdit and other project 
hcnefits (Ekanayakc ct al. IY90). If11  ANl!l?:~llHAPUR~l  f>l??-/ONf<  A<;Rl<'l 'l~ll~l~l  PROllX'l'  37 
The rate of settlement was just over 5 I  percent.  It was reported that the 
majority of thc farmers who have settlcd are either those who were living in 
nearby villages within a distance of3.4 km (2  miles) or thosc who were fmm 
far away places (over 7 km [4  miles]). The rate ofsettleincnt is considcrably 
lower in the group of  settlers who have residences within the rangc of 3.4-5 
km (2-3 miles) from the tank.  This was due, probably, to their having other 
means of income, being located very close to the main road.  These settlers 
appearcd to be reluctmt to risk coming to tank settlements, where irrigated 
cultivation was not possible for several consecutive years. 
Downstream Development and Water Management 
The downstrcam development carried  11ut by the Dcpartment of  Agrarian 
Serviccs included land leveling, building, construction of field channels, and 
some irrigatinn structiires. The work was done by the DAS staff, contractors 
as well as the farmers at different locations, as the work done by the Farmers 
alone in the initial year was not very effectivc.  Therefore, after 1986, DAS 
hired privatc contractors ti1 undertake more difficult areas of land develop- 
ment which involvcd the use of hcavy equipment. Since therc was no incnmc 
during the carlier stage of settlement. financial assistance (a  maximum of Rs 
2.000 per farmer) was given to lariners up tti the first harvcsl of  each scheme 
depending on the farmers' share dwork. In practice, only it portion of the 
entitled Rs 2,000 was paid to tlie farmers because part (if tlie money had to be 
utilized  for tlie  work  by  hired  contractors.  With  hmers' involvement, 
downstream work of only about30 out ofthe 83 tanks could be done by the 
cnd of  198.5. The work was slow. Machinery was riecded as some tanks had 
command areas with thick juiiglc and earth humps.  Some farmers left their 
plots owing to these difficulties.  The DAS then had to use heavy machinery 
through contractors to complete the job. 
Construction ol field channels and downstream  structures comprising 
drop walls, pipe outlcts, etc., was  the primary  role of the Dcpartment of 
Agrarian Services. Only abouta fourth nfthedesired channel structurcscould 
be  installed by DAS; the remainder comprised repairs or reconstruction of 
early work done by contractors under llie Irrigatim Department's  supervi- 
sion.  The governing  factor in Ihe  need  for repairs  to  once constructed 
structures was the time gap between Irrigation Department's completion of 3K  A  iwi ii.w 01.  ,.ti:~i:n.w~iik  .s-I~+iii~it:,s  FOR  iMwm  IM; iwi.s 
work, and DAS' start of  work which on average was about 3 years according 
to IIMI's  study. Apart from these delays, other reasons for reconstructinn 
were  poor quality  woi-k,  wrong design, and misplaced turnout  structures 
within thecommand area. Thesecons1ructii)ii works were given tocontractors 
by DAS. Although preference was given tothe Rural Development Societies 
for farmer  iiivolveiiicnt. in practice,  it too wed to  subcontract  to private 
contractors. Only about 5 percent ofdownslrcam development works in the 
tanks were done by the Rural Development Societies themselves while they 
subcontracted 24 percent to private contractors and 14 percent to ii I'cclinicuI 
Assistant (who applied for the contract under a talce iiame). Private cwitrac- 
ton alone coiitribiited 81 perccnl of lliis wwk. 
The DAS  hadtoattendtocon~truction  and repairworkscoming under the 
purview ofthe 1rrig;ition Department thus diverting the resources intended for 
water management and downslrcam work of the former to sonie olthe works 
ofthc latter. Even thoughfiirmers' iiivolvenient was rcduccd dun-ing  theearly 
part of the projec[, bccausc of the availability of the labor of settled Ikrincrs 
during the latter part of the project downstream development works of the 
prnjecl wcrc done with relatively high invnlveinciit oS  farmers compared to 
upstream developmeiil. When DAS  took over a lank from irrigation Deparl- 
ment for lowland development Ihc Divisioiial Officer of  DAS arranged a 
rnccling  with  the parricipationofiill heiieficiaries: at this mcctinga  fknerwas 
elected  as the  Farmer Keprcscntativc and a  group of  five or six Ihriners 
including thc Farmer Repi-esentstive was selected to the Tank Committcc. 
Status of Irrigated Agriculture 
Irrigated agriculture was not possihlc throughout the post-project period in 
most cases, but a third ofthe total number of tank areas was cultivated during 
1Y86/IYX7inahaandafifthduring  IY88yala. Even iiitliecultivaledarea, the 
extent irrigated  was limited  to a few acres, especially during the yala season. 
Furthemiore, the conimand arca cultivated was rain-fed rather than irrigated. 
Onereasonfornotirrigatingwastheli~r~itedvolu~ncofwatcrinthetank  while 
sonic tirmcrs did  not  cultivate their plots even though there was enough water 
in the tank. Only sonie selected filliners in several Vdnk  arcas with  sufficient 
water wcrc able to cultivate during successful \easons. Settlement problems 
comprised another reason for not cultivating irrigable area by some farmers. 'I  PI&.  ANl~l<Al)li~lPl  'HI  IX<Y-L(lNI: AGi<iCL'LIi!KI<  l'HO.li:ll  3  Y 
Technical  problems  that  occurred  alter construction  alm constrained 
irrigatcd cultiviitioii in a number of tank areas. The major technical prohlems 
fciund were thcperiiieabilityollhetankbund which allowed  the watertodrain 
a~,ay.  the wrong levcl oftlie niain canal from which some fields could not be 
irrigated, thc  insufficient  catchment  arca,  and  the  lach  of  water  in  the 
catchment area. 
Because  oi  these  problcms  most of  tlic  farmers have expressed  their 
doubts ahout the possibility of cultivating the total command areaof most of 
the tanks.  Of  tlie 2 I  surveyed tanks, only 15  percent (during yala 19x9) and 
IX  percent (during maha 1988) of [lie command area, respectively. could be 
cultivated,iscordingto thefarmcrs. Thetrue irrigableareacorrcspondsto the 
ehtiiiiates of thc 'Technical Assistant of  DAS which indicated that 60 percent 
of  the  Punks  have catchments insufficient to meet thc requirement of the 
planned comtnand area. Poor rains h;ive  been experienced in most if  tlie tank 
areas after lC)84/1985  resulting in the cultivation of only a limited extent 01 
thc comm;ind arca. 
A  limited number (illank areas selected for a pilot Water Management 
Program  in  19X411985  nnaha  showed  successiul  harvests,  as  DAS  gave 
guidance  to larmers  who  used  the  tank  water  sparingly  following  [lie 
Wulu,q(m~hahri  system."  However, as described earlier. irrigated agriculture 
could tiot be practiced in the majority of tank areits or in parts of tank areas 
during the past owing to lack (ilsufficient rains. low water-hdding capacity 
olthe  tanks, insufficientcntclnnientnre~~;ind  tccliiiiCal defectsoithe itnprovcd 
components. 
As n result of thcse combined [actors, the Water Managemcnt Program 
could llot hc carried out ilpiirl from ii  kw  lank ilreiis where the pilot Waler 
Managcnrent Project was conductcd in  1'981/19XS  niaha.  The Water Man- 
agement Program oi  DAS which was inlroduced to other partillel programs 
likc VIKPand IRDPscould not hc iniplemented because several requirements 
were Inot  sufficiently fulfilled. The need lor water management did no1 arise 
as then-c was 110  watcr in the tnnk (to manage).  Thus, ADZAP has provided 
only ii fen  comparable elements olthe Water Management Program such as 
"This is ii <y\fcm  wlncrc ltir whole prcpnrxlory slagc nlcullivoling includine clcal-in@. 
plowing and sowing is rnnducted nsing only rainled water anrl whcrc wnk  waicr is 
used only shout  il inonlli :ilicr sowing 40  ,I  ni:i IIW  oi: !tLw,&v,.im i  ,si'nliI(ui:s  FOK IMPROI'I,V<;  I ~i,s 
hasic institaitioiis like  the Farmer Representative and the Tank Committee  that 
were clccted in most of  the settled tank areas. 
Project Management 
The Ministry (if Agriculturiil Development and Ressarch ( 1977-19883 was 
thc  principal agency  rcsponsihle  for overall  project  management.  The 
detailed annual planning, budgeting oiid implementing 01 individual project 
components  resled  with  the  relevant  linc department  and  agencies.  In 
accordance with the loan agreement between the Asian Development Bank. 
the International Fund for Agricultural Development iliid the Government ol 
Sri  Lanka.aNational Project Conrdinating  Ciiminittee  wasappointed to assist 
the Ministry in  project implementation. This Committee comprised the heads 
ofthe ministries and departments  directly rcsponsihle forthe inajorcomponents. 
Although  thc  Prnject  Appraisal  Rcport  had  identified  19  institutions to 
participate in  the committee meetings, some 27 instituti~ns  have participated 
in the regular meecings (Niyangoda 1989).  Whilst National Project Coor- 
dinating Committee functioned at the nationel level, a Prnjcct Implementa- 
linn Committee wiis estahlished at the district lcvcl tinder the chairinenship 
of the District Minister, Anuradhapura. to determine a policy and to facilitate 
prnject-level coordination and implementatiiin. The National Project Coor- 
dinating Ciimmittee niet on an average of twice :I  year  while the Project 
Implementation C(immittee inet every two-and-a-lulf months. 
The imin  project management body was the Project Management OtTice, 
which had the functions of  dcvcloping iinplementatiiin ai-rangements.  estab- 
lishing budgetary and reimbursement prnccdures, and attending ti1 day-to- 
day impleincntation  activities ofthe  project. The Project Maniigcinent Office 
wnsmanngenhy;~Projecl  Director who worked full time in  theprqject. Three 
subject matter specialists in  the fields of engineering,  agronomy, and live- 
stock wcrc also appointed full tiinc to ii  t the Project Dircctor by liaising 
between the rclcvaiit department and thr pi-nject office. 
Although the projcct structure suggested hy the Staff Appreisal Kcport 
was cleated, the iiitroductim  iifpolitical leadership inlo the inanagement of 
the projcct gave way to a series of project planning and  implementation 
problems which constituted tlie very hasis of tlie project's failure.  This rate 
of  politicization lias not heen identified in any other project implementcd hy I HE ;~~~~R,~~lll,~l~~~K~~  IIRY-LONE ~lGNll'0LWK/~  f'KR(l/fCI  41 
state intervention. The main reason for the high degree of politicization may 
be the fact that the donors were not  directly involving themselves  in the 
project management compared to many similar projects. 
THE DEGREE OF SUCCESS 
A direct way oijudging the success ofa  project would be on how far the set 
oh,icclives have been achieved.  Compared to othcr state intervention\ in the 
improvement of small irrigation systems in Sri Lanka, ADZAP has shown a 
considerably low degree of success according to many observers and evalu- 
ators (Ekanayake et ill. 1990: Navaratne IY90: Niyangoda 1989). 
Thc ove~xll  cih.jecti\w  of estahlishing a technically viable and eciinomi- 
cally attractive farmine .  tcm in place of the chena, in  order to raise food 
production and increase the farmers' income, is not somethine that is readily 
measurable, as the pnilonged drought in the North Central Province during 
the latter part of the project period hindered the desircd scale of cultivation 
under many oithe rehahilitated tanks. Thc packagc given under the program 
has heen appreciated by the heneficiaries of some tank areas.  The farmers' 
iniliii satisraction appeared to he the fact that they had become permanent 
cultivators ownin'g I .h  ha (4  acre7) of lend including rice land. Wherever the 
larmers faced dilrirulries, the rate offarm establishment was rather Iuw and 
only about 30-40 percent iiSthe farm families have hccn settled in a few such 
settled tanks (Navaratne 1989). 
The irnportancc of  upland  cultivation in the project has been the most 
striking observation  in lhis project although this component had not  becn 
givcndueattention hy theprqjectauthoritiesfromtheheginning.  Theavcrage 
cropping intensityinasampleof21  lankswasS1 percentduringyala IY88and 
14 percent during inaha  1987iXX.  The corresponding values for irrigatcd 
cultivation in the connnand area are  IS  percent  lor yala and I8 perc.ent Sor 
maha.  Thcreiore, ADZAP is more successful  in  upland  farming than  in 
irrigated farming. Irrigated cultivation in the command area called for more 
labor at the initial stage whercas upland cultivation wits rasier and il familiar 
practice fbr 8 grwp of  cx-chena cultivators.  Apart from the low rainfall 
during  a  fcw years, the  unsuccessful  lowland  cultivatioii  was  seriously 42 
affected hy design defects like overestimation of command area, wrong and/ 
or  insufficienl catchment  area, delects in the bunds and  tank  bed?, and 
mistakes done in  planning the EIuices, gales, canals and outlets. 
Theexpecledcxtentofrice landstohe developed is I.903 ha(4,700acres) 
(if  which 1,745  ha 14.31 I  acres) hare been developed: but according to the 
estiinatcs prepared by the UAS office at Anur;idhapuia  the cultivable extciit 
would be only 1,05l1 ha (2.595 acres) provided tliiit nll tlie tanks get filled up. 
This is  an iihviouc rewlt  of “overpl;inning.”  The rice extent under each tank 
hiis been tlie binding iaclor for iiew settlers and owing to the unreliahility of 
cultivatimi of expanded lowland even during the rainy years, a considerable 
number orselccted settlers have either  deserted their iillolincnts or not hettled 
there at all.  lhe  kikd cxpcnditure incurred lor upstream and duwnstreani 
development isalittleovrr USR4.04 million(Ks 121 million)in 19X7,andthe 
pro iiltii (excluding other supportins expenditure) has hccn approximately 
US%2,325  (Ks  69.600) per ha (LS%9447  IRs 28,2001 per acre) for the total 
dcvelopetl area. hut this would he US$3,X65 (Rs  I  15,700) per ha (US$1.504 
[ Ks  46.XOO) per acre) when llic actual irrigable arca of I  .OSO ha (?,5‘)5  acres) 
is  taken into  account. When the total pnijcctexpzndirureoiUS~  12.76 inillioii 
(Rs  382 million) illid the total number of4,000 lamilies Lire  taken. the projcct 
has spent over US$.I,  I75  (Rs95.000)  persctllcrfamily which iscomparatively 
avcry high figure foraxnall-scale irri~ition/ieltlcincnt  scheme. Thus. in  the 
sense oScost-cl~~ctiveness  AIZAP  liiis hxl  il low late ofw 
in  the area  (if  irrig;ilcd agricullure which ic the iliain concern olthe present 
rcvicw. 
Altliough the pro,ject envisaged halting the chena ciiltiviitioii by helping 
chena fhisrs  10  hccmie periniinenl selllcr farmer\. it wil,  fotind that chena 
continues to play ii role in the aFriculturd livcl~hood  of the .;ettlcr\.  It is. 
howcvcr. not clear whether this practice will disappear once the farm families 
;ire fully setlled mil  Ihc fertility ofthe currcnl clicnii fields is  depleted ovcr a 
igc of  time. The low rate olscttlcinent is  acontribuling liictor forthe low 
degree of  success and other intended benefit5 in thr area 01’  irrigated cultivii- 
lion. According  10  the IlMl survey. lhc settlement rate is  as low  as 20 percent. 
Other sources rcvc~il  that out of 3.41 h allotments only 958 settler families (28 
percent) litid been seuled hy tlie end of 1086 (Niyangodii IUXY).  By  the end 
of 19x4. the c~~i~tructioii  otX0  kinks had  been completed and it was expected 
to settle 3.500 heneficiaries by tlie end oi  1986. It  is  iilm reported Ihat out of 
the tank iireas nhrc  firrners senled early, seven tank settlenients have becn 
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completely deserted by the settlers. What happened hcrc wiis that settlers 
tnove.d in. received tlic World Food Program assistance (food aid),  put up 
temporary huts, cultivated  chena criips (iiiaiie) during maha ;md left tlie land 
whcii the World Food Program assistance was withdrawn.  The settlement 
aspect was thus unsuccessl'ul becnusc of the inherent weakness of the project 
plan which lacked basic iieetls ofthe settlers such as houaing, drinking water, 
education. and health.  As the rate ofpoliticizati~in  was very high. unsuitable 
perwns rcccivcd lanil for "remote cultivation"  and not fw "\cttlcd cultiva- 
tion" 
Apart from the limited  nuinbcriifpi~sitive  ;ispect\oftIie project which iirc 
ourside"irrigated  iigriculture"as described carlicr, ADZAP  strategy has been 
ii  failure  in terms of  irrigation and  water management aspccts (Nav;iratne 
1989. Ekanayakcctal. 1990).  The identified reasons forthis t'ailurcviiryfronr 
administration lo  technical iispccts. Thei-e  are tit least five such re:isons.  First. 
the very high political domination and intervention in priiject 111' dnri  g  enient 
including financial  iilloctitioiis. selection 01  tanks aid settlers.  and  otlicr 
project activities have greatly contributed to malpractices iiiid deviation from 
the project design  Second. 5cll-innnngciiieiit of the projcct activities pre- 
sented inthesysteinbyIiiieagcnci~~nsare~ultolbulk;~lli~catiiini~flundsa~id 
insulficiciil finaiiciiil coiitrd hy the project ;iuthoritie\  is iiot found in my 
other multi-sectorill progruii.  Third  pro,icct steering by executing agencies 
of the Ministry of Agricultul-al I~evelopinciit  iind Rcmircli ;ind  tlie donors 
i  ADH and IFAD)  was insufficient. resulting in  tlie inisinanagcmcnt of pr(ijcct 
funds iintl activities. Fourth, there wiis obvious lack ofreairi work at tlic field 
level to achieve intended hcncfits hy the official5 ofthe line ;igencies, which 
hindered the development works lo a great cxtcnt. Finally. tlic ahserice of a 
rolling pliinninp stralcgy acciirdi~ig  to  the ground ~ituiiti~ii  alm hindcrcd tlic 
project  from  achieving  its ~h,iecti~es.  The  blueprint  did not  allow the 
incorporahn of aclditioiral fxilit  ics nccdcd fiir pcrinancnt ~cttlc~ncnt. 
At tlie early period of  the pro,iect it hiid to be  scaled dow~i  drastically 
(nunihcriif~anks  1023 percent and xttlcrr to40 percentoftheori~inal  target\) 
as the impleinrntiitio~i  01'  a bigger 1picct ;ippwrcd  to he difficult.  At the 
closure of the project the targeted figures olrice  area, upland wcii. scttlurs, i~nd 
other benefits iilso have become e~en  less.  Thus ADZAP is iin exiiiiiple of 
planning  Lh~(ire~'and  ;ichicving .'less." It  is  iilso noteworthy lliilt the obviiiiis 
lack of an  in-built eleineiit to achieve f~~r~nerparticipation  fur  the cntirc pnijcct 
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administrative and  technical  drawbacks described  above.  Achieving  the 
fullest participation even under working tank conditions such as VlRP and 
some [RDP  intervention has proven a challenge to the irrigation rnnnagement 
specialibls, and whcn it comes to rehabilitation of abandoned tanks in a CBSC 
like ADZAP. it calls for more careful planning tiir Farmer participation as 
“new tanks”involrc rnorc”har~lware”(e.g.,  labor for  construction) leading to 
tricky “software” (farmer organizations). CHAPTER 6 
The Small Tank Rehabilitation Program 
of the 
Freedom From Hunger Campaign Board 
INTRODUCTION 
Tile SKI I.nh~n  National  Frccdoni F'roni  Hunger Campaign Board (FFIIC) 
was first established  by  ii  Parliamenlary  Act  (No.IS of  1973) undcr  the 
umbrella  of thc thcn  Ministry  01 Agriculture  and  Lands,  with a view  to 
ful  implenientation of rural development programs of its own. Being 
uhlic corporation, FFHC has followed the strategy of niingovernmen~ 
organizations (NGO) in carrying out its vill  dcvelbpment activities. 
The development philosophy cniphasii  ) people's  pnrticipntion and 
alleviation 11i rural poverty; b) promoting and encouraging labor-intensive 
projects: ci  helpingchenacultivators to become settled farmers hy providing 
permanent land with facilities for irrigation; nnd di  assisting the poor people 
to enhancc their  living standards.  The primary objective of the Board's 
program is iiot the mere  restoration  or rc~iovatioii  01'  small tanks. but the 
improvcmcnt ot Lhe  qiiality of life of  the people living in the tank country. 
l'he FFllC is an example of a true govcrnmcnt~organi~ed  NGO where a 
rather rigid "blueprint"  type sniall tank rehabilitation program exists.  Thc 
FFHC's strategy for improving sinall tanks has hccn  subjected to various 
studies during the past few years. Thcrc studies compribed those done by the 
FFHC  officials, indcpcndent  research  work.  and studies  carried  out  by 
organimtions like  AKI'I  arid  IIMI.  The studies done by  llMl include  a 
Workshop (March 1989)  on the Role of NFOs in Improving Minor lrrigtitiix 
Syslems in  St'i Lanka and iui assessment survey conducted on the'l'hanthirimale 
projectduringthe latterpartof19X9. 'l'hereportofthelatterwill hepuhlished 
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as aii IlMl Working Paper (Dayaratne and Moragode [forthcoming, 199 I I). 
The participatory aspects of FFHC's tank rehiihilitation program liitve been 
reviewed  by  the  Project  Director  of  FFIIC  LII  another  llMl Workshop 
(Wi.jetunga  1986). Recently,  an  assessment  study  was  done  by Jayantha 
Pesera on FFHC's Rehabilitation (if Scattered Village Reservoir Coinmuni- 
ties  in Anuradhnpura  District iis  coinpared  10  tlie  National  Development 
Foundation's Tank  Renovali(in Program in Kurunegala: these assessineiits 
liiive been ~prcscntc'd  in  two different papers (Pcrcra lYX7 and  IOXXJ. At IIIC 
llMl  Workshop on tlie Role olNGOs.  Vimaladhanna hiis critically reviewed 
the two approache.; (Vim;il;rdharma  19891. 
PERFORMANCE 
Acciirding to FFHC sources, llie Board has completed the rehahilitation of 
115 tanksasolJunc 19x0. Ne;irly.1,100 farm liliniliesareestimated tohavc 
henefired from this program and the total extent of developed area under the 
prograrri is approxirnately 2.5  10 liii (6.200 aci-csJ  of rice  land and I  ,8XO ha 
(4,650 xres)  of  highland.  'Ihe total expenditure incurred on Ihe prugrm  is 
it lillle  hclow LJS$?.27 million  (Rs 6X  ~iiillioii  j. which give\ atotiil expenditure 
of over US$lO.OOO  (Ks  300,OOOJ. ;ipproxiin;itely,  per tank sctllcnient if the 
total is conbidered iis 222 tanks.  'l'hc targeted mount  has been incrcascd its 
ii rcdt  [if the rather hiph overhead costs of Ihc Board and the price escalatioii 
duriny Ihc liittcy part of the project implenrenlalion phase. 
The conslruclion  01 reservoir\ iiivolves: I  ) raising  tlic dam hy earth Filling 
and compacting hy drall power: 2)  repairing the old %pill:  3J  constructing an 
addition;d concrete sluice oftlie wp  type: iind 4) providing  ii feeder cliaiiiiel 
and iiniciil  at tlic Iicilcl of  the canal to divest wiiler.  According to the f:il-lners, 
the village-type sluices found iii llir ahandiincd tanks have been suhsequently 
chaiigeed 10  hlcp-typc sluices il'i a general principle oithe Board. The Sarmers 
found these step-type sluice? to be iiidficiciit. 
The projcct pcrfiirniance varies according to the location of different tiinh 
clusters. 'T1ic'l'hanlhirim;ile  cI  lister of tanks within the Anuradhapurii District 
wis  ;isbessetlas  ii coiiip~irativcly  succcssiul prii,ject because the Chief liicuiii- 
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selection, tank cons~ruction,  wew-s;ihhaforiniition.  and overall pro.icct activi- 
ties. The settler Camilies of most of the rank sctllcmentc in  the Thanthirimale 
project were either reliitivcs ofthe  Chieflncumhent or parties known to him. 
Because ofthisconncclion the Chieflncumhent hadcontrril overrhern, so that 
sctllerh strictly adhered to the Board's project activities leading to ;I  measur- 
able wccess in the latter. Ovcr 75  percent of the sctllers had been settled in 
the Thantliirimale area prior to the project undei- the colonicalion efforts 
ciirried out by tlic Chief Incumhent iiltlie  Thiunthirinialc temple. Therefiirc, 
unlike in ADZAP or any (ilher state settlemcnl program, the need for the 
did  notai-ise. In  other words, FFHC  intervened in  il tank 
settleinem project for groups of people who had been occupying a kind of 
"tank country"(Dayara1neand Moragiida Ilbrthcoming I99 I  I). The FFHC's 
tishistiuice  was  sought  mainly hy the  Chief Incumbent  hiinself  tor the 
restoration (ifthe  tank systems imd fortliehetrcriiry;lniriition  olfarmers under 
a "land ciin\olidution" pr(igrnm. 
In  Thanthii-imale.  72 wew-sabhas have been fcirincd for the iinplemcnta- 
tion ot the tank restol.iition priigrani.  But the planned fund for settlers (see 
Appcndix 1V)  has iiot hccn raised, end consequently. no miiintcnance could 
hc possihble under any of these tiinks.  How  r, it  wiis reported that clearing 
iifthe hund(ifmost tanks has heen done oil  year. During  the post-project 
years up to 19x6, it  was possible to  cultivate in  some ofthe restored tank areas 
forafew scasons.whilethc  Il)h'?/l~lX3rn;th;t  w;isiig~axlseari~ii  iorall  thetank 
arcns because fiirnicrs were able to cultivate the irrigahle extent with rice  or 
other crops.  For the last fciur 10  five seasons, however, irrigated agriculture 
Oils been ii failure mid kirniers seem to he rcIucta~it  10  atteiid to imitiiiteniiiicc 
won-k or men to cleaii tlic hund. 
As an  alternative 10  irrigated agriculture, hiinrestead and market-gardens 
have been developed in miis1 of the \ettlcd  toiih itreas.  Wcll-irrigation of 
homeslead f;irmh  has hccii riipidly increased in the highland area because Ihc 
prqject assistance  for dug-wclls could he  utiliied to construct  cultiviitioii 
wells each of 3-nietcr ( 10-11) dimiietcr.  Some peoplc Iizive ~~nstrii~tcil  ii 
cultivation wcll  juintly (one  for two farmer\) using the project money. as the 
R\ 6.000 given to i(  fmiicr wiis iiot sufficient 10 construct a cultivation well. 
In 'l'h;intlririmalc  it was observed lliiit more than SO percent of !lie larmers 
have c(insiructed tlieii- wells while others liave at leiist dug the pit aiming at 
supplcmeiitary  irrigation for liomchlead cultiviltiiiii.  Over  KO  pcrcent of 
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least as ameansiiftheir subsistence. The total areaoftheir highlands (0.6ha) 
including market-gardens  hiis hccn developed  by only a few  farmers (16 
percent) who own a water pump for well irrigation.  It was  noted chat one 
successful farnicr in  each lank Settlemcnt has practiced upland fanning in  the 
0.2-0.4  ha (0.5-1 acre) highland allotmenl, and that hc has managed to buy a 
watcr pump out (if  his  own s;wings. 
The wcw-sabha system could not perfonii well during the past few years 
owing to  the continuous dry spell.  Wewsahha buildings liavc been con- 
structed foreacli completed tank setllcment. but  they are often 1\01 utilized for 
the intended  purposcs of wew-sahha mectings and the storage of agricultural 
inputs. The railwe  to havericecullivatinn fora  few coii~ecutive  years and tlie 
farmers'  indifference to the wcw-sabha organizatiiin were the reasons for not 
utilizing  these buildingsoften. In  any case therc were fartiio many buildings: 
lhcie was a building in  each setllcment including those having only three ti1 
five inembers only: there wcre th'o or three such huildings within an area of 
one square kilometer.  The construction of one huilding for 2-3 hettlements 
serving 15-25 settlcr families would havc prevented this wastc. 
THE DECREE OF SUCCESS 
'Thc FFHC's sn-aregy 01  mobilizing heneficiiiries'  lahor and their participa- 
tion in coiistructiiin. operation and maintenance 01 the irripation cysteni is 
morcpro~ressiveandpriimisin:coniparedtosldtc  illtervenlionC, butlhcreare 
notahle shorlcomings in  its implernentatiiin.  The FFHC's strategy too ha\ 
hcen criticizcd as being il sotnewliiit ri&id blueprint approach compared to 
other  NGO  inlcrveiitioiis  like tlie  National  Development  Foundation 
(Vimaladharma. IWY).  It  isalsoarpedthat  FFHC'hniodel village concept is 
ii romanticized versioii of an idyllic Sinhaladry-zone villnge and planning  for 
its rcsuscitation under this strategy has become a top-down imposition. 
Although participation is  restricted since the FFHC's strategy  has perceived 
beneficiary participation mercly as concribtition 01 labor for  construction 
work. fanners' views on  changing snnie aspccts of the design and prqiect 
henelits have heen taken into consideratiiin during the iinpleincnlation stage 
(if the program in  Anuradhapuru.  The e\teblishment of wcw-sabhas has, to 'Tflt  SI1AI.L  TAili\iK NI~III~KII.I~~~IION  PIW(;I<.4M  49 
a certain extent, provided an opportunity to the villagers to be partners in the 
rchahilitation exercise with  the project officials.  During the consrruction 
period and initial ycars (if the post-project period the wew-sabha system has 
allowed  its  rncmhers to discuss their  needs  and  to plan  action  with  the 
assi\rance ofofficials ofthcBoard. Thishas definitely broughtahout positive 
aspectsofgroupatlitude, self-reliancc,andasenseofownershiplo thesystem 
among  the wew-sahha  members, who wcrc  otherwise  scattered  fanner3 
practicing  chena or pittoni (nicadow) cultivation  without any  perinanent 
means of livelihood. 
Unlike inany othcr interventions which merely plan only for the irrigation 
component, FFHC's land consolidation component has given ex11  farmer of 
a groop~ifrncroachedcultivalors  ownershipof.a lendarea of 1.4hn (3.5 acrcs) 
Sir  cultivation. This is similar to interventiuns adopted by ADZAP or some 
IRDPs; and FFHC being a statutory hoard rnanaged to get the cooperation of 
other agencies like the Land Commissioner's Departnient aid the Govern- 
ment Agent.  The ownership of land has made a tremendous change in thc 
'iettler families, who have been motivalcd by a development package which 
is a coiiimon god. 
'l'lie sele~hii  pi-ocrss appears to hc sound hut in its iniplemcntatioii, il 
considerahlc nuniber of  small tanks were also selected whohe rehahilitation 
was tiot feasible. For instance in Thanthirimalc, ofthe 70 tank areas, 3 I have 
less tliaii 10 beneficiarics and I3 have 3-5 families. This has happened under 
the influence of  the Chief Incumhcnt of  the temple of the area, and most such 
tiny tanks lhad been encmachcd on by his relatives or  known parties. The ill- 
cffccl of this kind of selection hiis been  that  a  large sum of  moncy (e.g.. 
USSS.000 to US%X.iSO [Rs 150,000 to Rs 250,0001 per tank hcncliting only 
three families) lhm  been spent on very sniall tiink areas with a very limited 
coinrnand area.  It is also ohserved that most ofthese tank areas are occupied 
by one extended fiimily unit. which has both positive and negative impacts. 
The positive iinpact is the l~rination  of  very cohcrent farmer groups Icd by an 
adult iniile  of such  an extended  Family:  and conflicts among wew-sahha 
members are iiiiiiiiniil under this situiition.  The negative iinpact is thal inore 
feasihle lank areas and eligible landless fiiriners  have heen  leli out of the 
program. 
Another  drawhack  in  this  stralegy  appears  to he  the  long  delays  in 
receiving  project  benefits by  the settlers.  There werc complaints hy  the 
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ment. dug-well construction, cultivation loans, etc. A noticeable drawback in 
the Thanthirirnalc FFHC Project  was the long gap between  the claim  fbr 
incentive payment5 10  land developrncnt and receiving the same froni the 
District Project Office (Dayeratne & Moragnda [forthcoming 1991 I). The 
project accounring system too has no1 hccn developed 111 an acceptable levcl 
at least by a general reviewer. i-cculting ill sonie inismaniigement ($funds iit 
the districr level. I'arincrs have reported that tlik hiis led to a certain degree of 
corruptioii hindering the iiitrndcd henefitc reaching the target families. 
Construction acliviries tahe a fairly long rime when manual lahor is used. 
Thus, the main criticism leveled against ihc FFHC'.; straicgy was the use 01 
beneliciary labor alone. 'l'his, according to  the findings (if  the llMl study 011 
FFHC, hils Id  to other problems like farmer di\;ippointinent  resulting in the 
longgg;ip  between thecompletion nfcmstruction ol'nne item to the heginning 
of nniither. and the need for repiiirs to some items alrcady completed evcn 
hefore ii lank was used for any cultivation purposc. CHAPTER 7 
The Tank Renovation Project 
of the 
National Development Foundation 
INTRODUCTION 
Ttiti wrii)NAi. iuwEi.iirMmT Foundation (NDF)  is  a true nongovemment or- 
ganization established in I979 under the Societies Ordinance dSri  Lanka as 
a nonprofit v(ilunvary agency. The NDF is  a variant of FFHC, and was based 
on  the  same  principles  of farmer  mobilization but without  any  link to 
government agcncics. Thc NDF auempted to avoid the negative features of 
FFHC in  order tu  ~lcvclop  an open, pragmatic. and more flexible approach to 
rum1 dcvclopmcnt. 
The stated objectives of NDF were to: a) build  up villagers' self-conMencc 
to handle their political, economic, cultural, and social affiirs by themselves; 
b)  help villagers  10 idcntily their  resources and mobilize them  to  their 
advantage with tlie least external help:  c) assist villagers 11)  realite their 
strengths and power  so lliat they  would be able to know their  rights and 
demand them; and d) mobili7e villagers at the grass-mots lcvel with the help 
ofchange agents to iirganire theinselves into  groups to carry out development 
cll'iirts  in  rural areas. 
The policies, projects and areas ofdcveloptnent of  NDF were decided by 
the managemcnt couiicil which comprised seven members.  The NDF has 
hithcrki implenrented four development projects, namely, Tank Rcnovation 
Prqjects, Bio-gas and Integrated  Farming  Project, Income-Generating Project 
for Women, and MuthukandiyaRehahilitatioiiProject. The important  aspects 
of all tlie pwjects were the iipportunities given to women and children in the 
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development exercise and getting beneficiaries to decide on programs that 
suited their sociocconoinic and environmental concerns. 
Thc NDF has overcight years’ expericnce in planning, implementing and 
evaluating several regional  development  projects.  The magnitude  of  its 
projects, however, is small cornparcd to that of othcr interventions as it has 
only tried out a series of pilot or preliminary programs.  Nonetheless, the 
impact of  these pi-ojects has crcated a certain positive reputation among the 
rural development and academic circles.  The NDF‘s development program 
has been reviewed recently by several agencics and individuals.  Apart from 
the donors’ reviews, Jayantha Perera has carried out an appraisal in 1988 as 
a sequel to his Appraisal ofthe Small Tank Rehabilitation Program of.FFHC 
(Perera 19x7).  At the IlMI/ARTl Workshop on “The Role of NGOs in the 
Improvement of Minor Irrigation Systems in Sri Lanka” too, NDF’s strategy 
was presentcd and discussed as one of NGOs directly involved in irrigation 
improvement  (Magedaragamage  lYX9).  At  the  same Workshop Kapila 
Viinaladhartna (1989) presented a paper comparing the strategies of FFHC 
and NDF in the rcnovation of village irrigation schemes. 
The renovation (if ininor tanks in Kurunegala and Puttalam districts hes 
been onc of the six projects NDF identilicd in carrying out its rural develop- 
ment program.  This tank renovali(in project was funded by  the Australian 
Freedom From Hungercampaign (AFFHC). In 1984,  NDF  selected 16 ininor 
tanks in Kurunegala District for renovation following its development strat- 
egy which is given in Appendix V. 
PERFORMANCE 
Out of the 16 lanks selected for its pilot project in Kurunegala District, NDF 
had completed the renovation of 10 villagc tanks by the end of  1989. A total 
of 172 farm Pamilies had benelitcd and 88 ha (218 acres) had been irrigated 
by  the pwject.  The NDF’s tank  renoration project had increascd the total 
irrigahle area under each tank by  10-25 perccnt.  The command area of these 
10 tanks ranges fnim 2.8 ha to 15 ha (7 to 36 acres). 
Farmers’ organizations have heen formed Iiir each tank  and a “Small 
Farmer Federati~in”  for all project lanks had been created to cope with the .riii:  'I~NK  Kc.wolitrriow Pmiwr  53 
overall operation and maintenance of the renovated tanks and for the so- 
cioeconomic benefit ofthe  farm families. The value of farmers' contribution 
toward the renovation of these tanks had amounted to US$3,275 (Rs.98,000) 
of which lJS$2,600(Rs  7X,000) was in cash whilc that of DAS had amounted 
to US$l0,000 (Rs 300.000) for services and supplies.  The ND1"s coniribu- 
tion from AFFHC funds had been a little oYer US$40,000 (Rs I.?  million). 
'Thus. a total of about US$53,500  (Rs  I .6 million) had been spent for the pilot 
project.  If this amount is taken  as hase cost, pro-rata cost is US$608 (Rs 
18,200)  per ha  and [he project had ?pent US$3 10 (Rs 9.300) per farm family. 
The NDF's  future programs will  he based  on the experiences of  the pilot 
pi-ojcct  and will he uscd in other districts including Kurunegala and Putlalam. 
THE DEGREE OF SUCCESS 
The NDF had developed a strategy superior to  FFHC's strategy.  It had made 
efforts to  overcome shortcomings of  the latter.  There were at least three 
elements which were mwc  priigrcsrivc than other interventions of impI-oving 
the village irrigation systems: 
a)  The rcnovation program was totally planned, designed and implemented 
with the actual participation of  the beneficiaries; this is not seen in any 
other strategy. 
h)  Mmual labor as well as machinery for constructioii work were used for 
making the best we  of available resources. 
c)  Flexibility in planning and implementing the program was dccided hy the 
bcneliciaries, in contrasl to blueprint programs of other orgunizations. 
Theprojectisreportedtohavebeencompletedititwophases,onein  1984- 
85 and the other in 1985-86.  After I-cnovalion of these ldnks, farmers were 
made the operators under the farmers' organization. The DAS and NDF gave 
the necessary support for system manaeement.  The farmers faced  il severe 
drought in 1986  after this renovation. Because they had consumcd their sccd 
rice for food there was a shortage 01'  seed rice Cor  the 1987 yala.  The NDF 
organized addilional  Cunds from the Oxford Committee for Famine Relief 
(OXFAM) Cor  credit to the farmers for inputs for the coming season through 
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collect loans after the harve.  few farmers could lint ply  back the loans and 
they were not eligible for further loans. 
Farmer groups were organized. a group fiind was established, and sub- 
committees for different activities like water management were formed. This 
process has helped farmers ti1 clcct their Parm leaders, to enact a conatitutiiin 
for the society, 10  open a group bank account, and to discuss their needs and 
problems with NDFandotheragencies. Thegroup  fundshavebeen increased 
and arc used for iinnual maintenance work.  Although the drought of 1986 
hindered some anticipated benefits, hcncficiaries of this project have organ- 
ized themselves to build credit and marketing institutions to ascertain their 
own  capability to achieve their socioeconomic objectives.  As a result, thcrc 
is selr-confidence  among farmers  in using their own resources in a place 
where people were not aware of such resources earlier; there is a sense ul 
responsibility and community consciousness in  a place where beneficiaries 
themselves used 10  damagethe bund and channel for illegal water-tapping; 
there is  at least one crop of  rice or  alternative crops with assured water supply 
in tlie  rice fields  whcrc even a  rnaha crop was  not possihle hr  the  LoVal 
command area for  several years:  and more land could he  brought  under 
cultivation (Pcrcra 19XX). 
As an overall impact of the ahove project benefits. the average yield 01‘ 
unmilled rice peracrc has increased from I.800 kilograms per hectarc (kgihn) 
(35 hushcls per acre) LO 4.640  kglha (90 bushels per acre) according to the 
priijcct evaluation sources (ihid). Whcncvcr the entire command ma  cannot 
be cultivatcd owing to cliniatic conditions (reduced rainlall during the dry 
scltson) the farmers begin to cultivate on the hi~tliriru  system or to go for other 
field crops. This typeof groupcultivation arrangement could  wily he possible 
hy a communal decision-making Incchanism. which hiis developed thriiugh 
NDF’s strategy.  As it  appears at present, the estahlishcd pcisitive features of 
NDF, namely. group discussions. ginup activilies, communal coiisciotisncss. 
sense  of  responsibility, sensc  nl ownership of  the  system.  finiincial and 
physical  resources mobilization among  themselves.  leadership  building, 
mutual  help,  and  adapvalion  to  agl-icultur.ul innovati(iii  liiive hound  tlie 
irrigation systems  togctlier.  The Small  Farmer Fedcration which  is the 
umbrella urganization nf the ten groups of farmers lhas been functioning as a 
mcchanirm for  con ti nu nu^  systcin operation.  The ability [if this type of 
organiration 10  siisrain il system without falling is something that should he 
evaluated when the project hcciimes ielf-managed in anothcr lcw years. CHAPTER 8 
Farmer First and Farmer Last: 
Conclusions and Recommendations 
TIII:. AI 'ri:i(NAi'iv~.srKl\rC(,iCS  reviewed in  the previouschapters have developed 
their  own  different  intervention  approaches  and nicthodiili~gics  to rcacli 
illmost tlie sainc goal. namely, improvement of small irrigation systems in Sri 
Lanka to increase the income level of the beneficiary farm families. 
CONCLUSIONS 
Several conclusions could hc drawn from tlie comparison of these  inajor 
governmerit and nongoveimient interventions for minor irrigatiiin: 
a)  Minor irrigition systems with  limited catchment areas iii the dry zone 
suffer morc  frim  lack  of  adequate  water  to  support  the  earmarked 
comiiieiid  areas even in the niaha season tliiin thiisc in the intermediate 
7,one: this has partially contributed t(i failures experienced hy ADZAP and 
FFHC in Anuradhapurd District. aparl from their design and iinpleinen- 
tation deficiencies. 
13)  Generally. the IRDP minor irrigation component has been successfully 
incorporated  into  other supporting  scrviccs involving all  the relevant 
agencies so that  projccl coordination  has become more effective than 
either in VlKP or in ADZAP. 
c) Adniinistrdtion  at district  levcl  has  caused  easy  implementation  and 
monitol-ing compared to centrally controlled prqiects. 
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d)  More problem-oriented irrigation projects (like in HlRDP's tank-bascd 
settlement clusters) could be implcmented :is  an outcome of  the rolling 
planning strategy of bilaterally funded IRDPs. 
e)  Coordination among agencies  as well  as between  farm  families  and 
agencies iseasicratdistrict level than in thecentrally coordinated projects 
likc VIRP. 
t)  Participatory system management is within the reach of IRDPs whereas 
the ccntrally controlled lop-diiwn strategy (VIRP) is more bureaucratic. 
obstructing Ihrnmcrpiirticip;ition at initial stages (e.g., HIRDPhasmanaged 
t~ implement ii successful Water Management Program in the majority of 
the rehahilitated tanks). 
g) Although ADZAP was dictrict-bascd  in theory. it could not achieve the 
successful results of IRDPs in practice. yartly  due to  the fact that the 
project was inanagcd cen1r;illy by the Ministry of Agriculture which did 
not have experience in implementing an irrigation-cum-settleinciit prqject, 
and paitly due to the poor dcgrce of  monitoring of the project activities. 
(h) The high degree of politicization in ADZAP as a result of  the in-built 
weakncsscs in prqiect plarining and implementation has caused a negative 
impact on the selcction of tanks iind farmcrs. 
The development components [if the iilternative strategies are compared 
in Table 1 whilst qualitative development indicators are compared in Table 
2. 
The t(ip-downapproachof varyingdegree is adonrinant feature inall state 
interventions while FFHC and NDF liavc a nongovernmental approach.  In 
origin and administration, FFHC too is close to being a state intervention but 
it has developed an NGO strategy as most of its donors are also wcll-known 
NGOs. All the state interventintis have a direct style and FFHC ha:. adopted 
an indirect style as beneficiaries arc consulted thmugh wcw-sdblus.  The 
NDF has gone even furthcr, adopting a catalytic style of intervention by its 
"change agent" approach. 
Farmers' mobilization in blucprint-type World Bank and ADB funded 
programs is very poor resulting in litlle farmer participation throughout the 
The rigidity of the "blueprints" in VIKP, the Kurunegala lRDP and 
ADLAP has failed to place the farmer first.  Some of  thesc strategies have 
made  urisucccssful  attempts to niohili~c  farmers  at  the  latter part  of  the 
project, which havc proved impracticable. With their high degree oftlexibil- 
ity, the strategies of  HIRDP and NDF have proven that a correct approach lit. - planned 
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farmer mohilization, to get them  to participate  in  the overall  process  of 
pmhlcm idcntification through self-manitgcment, is the key towards sustaiii- 
able system management. In other words, farmers have to be put first for their 
direct involvement since 0  & M and self-management have to he achieved in 
the sphere of  village irrigation.  What has happened in blueprint, centrally 
controlled, hureaucratic-type stratcgics is that as sooii as assistance is with- 
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**  Based 011  the qualitative analysis olprcvioos \tudics: i.e.. Aheyratne 1986 
Medagema IYXh. Perera J. 19x7 & 1988. and Ekanayakc  ct al. 1990. 
been developed to make fanners the managers 01 their systems.  Seeking tlie 
farmers' participation merely for the Water Management Programs at the tail 
endofaproject wouldnotbeadequate.owingtothelaclthat  by theendofthe 
program these stratcgics have created a high rate of dependency on the stute, 
instead of a sense of  ownership among farmcrs. These strategies have thus 
failed to show sustainahility which is the "penalty" for putring farmer litst. 
Another fcdture of a flexihle type of intervention is that its manageinent 
is more decentralized to district or projcct level, and it is more target-group (O~VCLOSIONS  AVO K~COMMEI’I~A~IONS  SY 
[irtargct-arcanrienled. This  is  quileopposite to the bltiepririt~approach  where 
projects are carefully controlled resulting in  a high degree of  bureaucratic 
procedures; furthesmose, donors have an “upper hand” to control the project 
activities, wheieas target-oriented projects have a higher degree of freedom 
and llexibility to plan the project and funds to suit the needs of the benefici- 
aries. 
One positive feature adhered to by  the state strategies is  the presence of a 
mcchanism for (ingoing monitoring arid evaluation. This has not been made 
a condition for NGOs.  The NDF has developed a kind of  feedback through 
its coordinators for monitoring purposes but it  is  not adequate.  The FFHC on 
the other huncl,  hcing a governmcnt  organized  NGO with a less-flexible 
prupram. has iiot developed an acceptable inonitoring and evaluation tool, 
wliich in tusn has caused overexpenditures and mismanagement to a certain 
extent. 
‘She coniparison shows that all the alternative strategies reviewed herein 
have positive  iis well  as negative qualities. Although  qualitative or subjective 
judgments have bcen made in  compasinp aspects likc l~iriiiesparticipation  and 
farmer mohili7,atinn. they have heen derived from previous studies done hy 
various authorities ah indicated.  ‘She terms ”good,”  “moderate”  and “poor” 
have been used herein in  a broader sense to distinguish the contrasts among 
the different strategies.  What we considered  as good or bad (positive or 
negative) qualities are in  terms ofpcrfonnancc, impact and systcm sustainability 
of villuige irrigation.  The state inkmenlion strategies with a blueprint-type 
approach in  this context have more negative qualitieh than good qualities. 
And flexible,  target-  or problem-oriented  strategies  have more positive 
qualities as they have tried to taclilc thc most dcbatahlc problems of  farmer 
mobilization and people’s  participation.  This does  not  mean that  these 
strategies are one hundred percent pertect or sound, hut that thcir positive 
fcaturcs could be made use of  for a better strategy in  the future for achieving 
“real”  farmer-managed  irrigation 
RECOMMENDATIONS 
Based on the above comparison, certain recommendations are suggested for 
the better usc of  rcsources lor sustainable management of village irrigation 60  A  RIJI’IIW or ..qLrmhi,(ll\  8.  SIKAII(;II~.~  I;OI? IMI’IKIIIN(;  FMIS 
systems in Sri Lanka.  These recommendations necessarily call for further 
refinement based probably on specific action-research.  The strategyisuate- 
gies that carried positive or negativeelements for the recotnmcndations made 
are indicaled in parcnthcscs. 
*  Selection ofsystemsand beneficiaries: A situation report on real ground 
conditions basedon unbiasedsurveys ibdesirablcto sclcctthe mostdeserving 
systems and beneficiaries  in order to avoid the political, bureaucratic and 
project biases; this should includc an ”application” process from the local 
farmers.  In tank selection, selecting all the abandoned tanks (systems)  in a 
catchment should be avoided as Far  as possible in order that themost l‘easiblc 
ones qualify in every aspect (posilivc: HIRDP, NDF;  negative: ADZAP. 
FFHC). 
*  Farmer mobilization:  The beneficiary farmers should be mobilized and 
involved in project activities from the very beginning of the intervention ti] 
ensure  their  conridence and  active  participation  throughout  the  process; 
resulting in spontaneous ”take-over” by the farmers themselves to continue 
thc system management.  A  kind of. “in-built” catalytic process is highly 
recommended  in this regard (positive: NDF; Ncgativc: VIRP). 
*  Project designing: During thc dcsign stage it is of vital importance to 
incorporate aspects like the size orthe cakhmcnt arca, the tank capacity and 
the duty. and the relationships among canal system, command ares and crop 
management (negative: FFHC, ADZAP). 
*  Organization for planning and implementation: To mitigate organi- 
zational, construction and water management issue!,  that crop up during the 
planning and implementing stage it is recommended to establish a “vigilant 
implcmcntaliiin body” in thc form of  a “Reservoir Council” which should 
include farmer representatives  and  relevant  officers of  the agencies con- 
cerned; the present Rcscrvoir Council should be given enough teeth to cope 
with the above issues (positive: NDF; negativc:  FFHC). 
*  Integrated program planning: To avoid risk ofcrop failure in uniniodal 
rice-based  agriculture,  innovations for an  integrated plan  including crop 
divcrsificalion bothin rice and rain-fed upland areas are required.  Off-farm 
activities and community work should be included in any sustainable strategy 
(positive: HIRDP, FFHC). 
*  Farmer participation in pruject activities: Farmers and their families 
should be involved in project activities as a means of off-farm employment ~ON~‘I.I/.SIONI  A‘YI) MI.<  OM~MI;NI~AIII~N.S  01 
during theconstruction period andtocnsurctheircontinuousadherencetothe 
projcct so that they would participate in the Water Management Program and 
system management during the critical post-project period. The background 
should he such that thc farmers should feel they are the dominant and integral 
part  of  the  process  and  not  mere  recipients  or  depcndcnts  of  a  set  01‘ 
externalities (positive: HIRDP, NDFJ. 
*  Land consolidation and regularizatiun uf uwnership: Whcncvcr land 
tenurial and ownership problems occur in a prnjccl area. land consolidation 
and regularization ofownershiparc it prcrcquisite of  an integrated approach. 
It has been round that ownership to a land block could do wonders to the 
farmers’ lives and thereby to the related agricultural development (positive: 
IIIRDP. FFHCJ. 
*  Attitudinal change of officers for common benefits: For better results 
of a pro,jecl aiming at village irrigation improvement, the field-level officers 
should be dedicated and should always he tlexihlc and humble tn minimize 
the ofiicer-farmer gap and to do  away with the state “bureaucracy.” Here the 
latioilale is that the “officers should understand farmers fully” rather than the 
othcr way round (positive: NDR negative: VIRP). 
*  Ensure farmer leadership in the program: Farmers should lead the 
Reservoir Committee and fanner leaders should he elcctcd annually allowing 
new and young energetic farincrs to participate in the management of the 
sysleni and Lo  generate group funds for the comnion benefits. This will help 
to eradicate the domination of  the local elite in a program of common interest 
(positive: NDF). 
*  Project management and coordination: To ensure horizontal  project 
coordination and to prevent top-down (vertical) mmagcmcnt. subdistrict or 
prqject-level management with the representatiues of beneficiaries is recom- 
mended.  Linkages  among  all  parallel  agency  people are desirable  for 
coordinated activities (positive: HIRDP, NDF). 
*  System  sustainability:  Physical,  institutional.  and  managcmeinl 
stistainahilityofthesystetn should hemadcancxplicitly articulatedobjective 
throughout the project from the fortnulation to the “handing over” phase by 
a mechanism developed following the above recommendations. 
In summary: the correct approach of a strong assistance strategy should 
include:  I) the careful  selection  01’  viable systems: 2) the building up of 
coherent farmcr groups based on their needs: 3)  the actual  involvement of 
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nature of assistance to gradually minimize the dependency attitude: 5)  the 
integration of  irrigation sysleni inlo a morc “complete  system” including the 
presently missing elements of diversified crops, nonirrigated agriculture, 
nonlarm activitics, cnvironmcntal considerations, and other socio-physical 
aspects of the community: and 6) the  establishment  of  a kind of  ”farmer 
union”  or “federation”  10  cope with their  problems pertaining ti) system 
management. marketing and other institutional aspects, and social needs. 
Although  nonc  11f  thc  stratcgics  rcviewed  in this  paper  contilins  an 
acceptable in-built  mechanism with  all  elements lorsuslainability.  all  of them 
possess one or more elements which need to be collected. integraled, rcfincd. 
and tested toward developing such a mechanism for system sustainability in 
the context of. Farmer-Managed Irrigation Systems. 
Thei-e is no short-cut method for system sustainability apart from iiivolv- 
ing farmers ti) take chargc of thcir systems throughout and after the interven- 
tion  psocess.  Fmners  should be the “agents”  for management rather than the 
recioicnls of  burcaucratic dircctivcs. APPENDIX I 
Strategy of the Village Irrigation 
Rehabilitation Project 
Introduction 
ACCORDING  TO THE  Staff Appraisal Report (SAR) of the World Bank (1981). 
it was planned to rehabilirdte 1,200  village irrigation systems, modernize SO0 
more similar systems, and promote systematic water management in  the 
rehabilitated and modernized systems.  The VIRP envisaged to encompass 
some 3  1.500 ha of irrigated land with the objective of  increasing agricultural 
production and farmers’ income.  The number of farm families estimated to 
have benefited is 20,000-25,000.  The VIRP has covered 14 administrative 
districts of Sri Lanka, most of which are in the dry zone with some extending 
their areas to the intermediate and the wet zones (Figure 2).  In the rehabili- 
tated and modernid  tank areas the cropping intensity was expected to be 
increased from 82.5 to 116.2 percent, with an increase of 41  percent in per 
capita income. 
The project was planned initially as a five-year plan from 1980-85 and 
subsequently its life span was increased by another two years up to 1987. The 
estimated  project cost was  US$43.6  millon  (Ks  784  million) with  main 
budgetary  allocations for  civil  works.  equipment,  staff  costs,  training, 
evaluation, and technical assistance (World Bank 1981 :  27-37). 
To achieve theohjectiveofrehabilitating 1,200village irrigation systems, 
modernizing 500 similar systems and promoting a systematic water man- 
agement methodology, VIRP has developed  a strategy including a set of 
special selection criteria,  project planning, andaprogram for  watermanagement 
and maintenance. 
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Selection Criteria 
In selecting tanks, emphasis was given to the rehabilitation of schemes with 
less investment to get maximum benefits and to enhance the performance of 
the system. The highest priority was thus given to minor schemes providing 
greater returns to improvement and repair and to those having any interaction 
between neighboring tanks in the catchment or between anicuts on the same 
stream; the lowest priority was accorded to long-abandoned schemes (“safe” 
systems) which required complete reconstruction. 
The criteria developed are summarized below. 
a)  Command area was to be not less than X ha (20 acres) unless a tank was 
in a cascade system where water flowed from one tank to another and 
improvements were required toprovide safetyforthesystemdownstream. 
b)  Systems in occupied areas with easy access were to be given priority. 
c)  The useful storage of the tank was to he not less than0.91 hectare-meters/ 
ha (ha.m/ha  [I  .5 acre-feet/acre]). 0.76 hamha (2.5 acre-feethcre) and 
0.46 ha.m/ha( 1.5 acre-feet/acre)ofcommandareainthedry,intermediate 
and wet zones, respectively. 
d)  The useful tank storage was not to exceed 70 percent of  yield potential 
computed from the iso-yield curves of the lmgation Department. 
e)  The tank was to benefit at least 10 families. 
f)  The area brought under direct maha irrigation was to be at least ten times 
the privately imgated submerged lands or three times the other cultivated 
submerged lauds. 
g)  The soils of the catchment area, reservoir and the command area were to 
he suitable for their respective purposes. 
h)  Thepro-ratacostatmid-l9XOpricesexcludingpricecontingencyetc.,  was 
not  to exceed Rs  12,350ha (Rs 5,OOO/acre)  for existing  areas and 
Rs 24,700ha (Rs lO,OOO/acre) for incremental areas.  These Costs have 
been increased to Rs 21,600ha (Rs 9,00O/acre) for existing areas and to 
Rs 43,225ha (Rs IX,OOO/acre) for incremental areas since 1986. 
Project Planning 
The project aimed to increase agricultural production and farmer income in 
existing village irrigation schemes by:  i) rehabilitating village tanks and APPENDIX I  65 
anicuts; ii) strengthening the major government institutions involved in 
village irrigation; iii) initiating a systematic Water Management Program; 
and iv)establishingevaluationprograms  designed to assist project implemen- 
tation and the preparation of further programs. 
The project had three major features: a) civil works, b) operation and 
maintenance, and c) project evaluation and investigation. 
The civil works component comprised rehabilitation of 1,200 schemes by 
the Irrigation Department entailing repairs to and remodeling of tank bunds, 
sluices, spillways, anicuts and irrigation distribution systems including field 
structures; modernization of working schemes by the Department of Agrarian 
Services (DAS) with a view to facilitating the introduction of  the Water 
Management Programs: andprovision of survey material duringconstruction- 
maintenance, quality-control equipment and the necessary transport vehicles. 
Nearly three fourths of the total project costs came under this component of 
the Irrigation Department. 
The operation and maintenance component comprised strengthening of 
the  capacity  of  DAS  to  service the  O&M of  minor  inigation  through 
incremental staff, equipment and vehicles; the introduction of  systematic 
Water Management Programs on project schemes; and support for ongoing 
training programs in basic technical skills as well as management training 
programs. 
The  project evaluation and investigation component included monitoring 
of project impact on agricultural production by the DAS field staff and the Sri 
LankaFreedomFromHunger Campaign Board(FFHC) withthe Department 
of Census and Statistics; systematic data collection and evaluation programs 
by the Land and Water Use Division of the Department of Agriculture and 
regular socioeconomic evaluation studies of project impact by the University 
of  Peradeniya. 
The Water Management Program 
The Water Management Program (WMP) was p1anne.d with the main objec- 
tive of making optimum use of rainfall and stored water. The planned Water 
Management Program consisted of the following activities: 
a)  Construction of field channels with control structures. 
b)  Introduction of a rotational water supply system where appropriate. 66  A  REVIEW OF A1:ICRNATIIE ,STRAXGII<S FOR IMI’RDVING  FMIS 
c)  Plowing and sowing as early as possible in maha. 
d)  Introduction of after-harvest plowing following either the maha or yala 
crop  so as to keep the soil open for easier rainfall infiltration and plowing 
early in the following season. 
e)  Operation  of the sluice to  ensure stored water would be used only to 
supplement rainfall during maha and yala, with the sluice closed when 
irrigation requirements could be met by rain. 
0  Closure of the sluice at night to prevent night irrigation. 
g)  Introduction of  a stand-by rationing system when stored water supplies 
would fall short of normal requirements. 
h)  Promotion of short-duration rice varieties to reduce water requirements 
and to ensure an early harvest. 
i)  Promotion of  irrigated upland  crops during yala wherever soils would 
permit it. 
For the formulation of  the Water Management Programs an Agricultural 
Planning Team (APT) was planned to be appointed for each project district. 
The APT was to comprise a Technical Assistant, an Agricultural Instructor 
(Agronomist) and a Divisional Officer (for institutional aspects). To ensure 
that physical  improvements were consistent with operational procedure a 
preliminary Water Management Program  was  prepared  even  before  the 
rehabilitation work wascompleted. This program wascarriedout by theTank 
Committee. The relevant ofticer of  APT would undergo additional training 
in water management, initiated and developed by DAS in consultation with 
the Department of Agriculture at the Maha Illuppallama In-service Training 
Institute. Emphasis was given to  ensurecooperation and consistency between 
the Department of  Agriculture and DAS training which included practical 
issues and extensive field practice on neighboring tanks. 
The project proposed to cover schemes in convenient locations which 
would he selected during the early years in order to facilitate supervision by 
the limited DAS staff.  The project planned to  provide funds to DAS to 
undertake limited civil works necessaly to modernize working tanks located 
close to the rehabilitated tanks of the project and they would he included in 
the Water Management Program.  This type of modernization of working 
tanks would cost Rs 50,000  per scheme (at  1980 prices)  and  some SO0 
schemes were earmarked under the project to be started from 1983, allowing 
time for watermanagement organizationof DAS tobeestablished and togain 
the much needed experience on the rehabilitated tanks by the civil works APPENDIX  I  67 
program of the Irrigation Department.  For the other rehabilitated schemes 
(not located in convenient locations), the water management improvement 
proposed (e.g., early plowing, closure of sluice when it rained, etc.) would be 
implemented by the fanners themselves with the help of DAS and Department 
of Agriculture field staff (CO & KVS). The DAS would also be responsible 
for undertaking maintenance and repair work where such work was beyond 
thecapacityof thefarmers. The normal allocation limitsfor suchminor  works 
have been increased from Rs  50,000 to Rs 100,ooO per scheme.  The DAS 
would also be equipped with the necessary machinery and personnel to meet 
maintenance and emergency requirements of minor constructions. APPENDIX I1 
Strategy of the Kurunegala 
Integrated Rural Development Program 
THE VILLAGE  IRRIGATION schemes project included the rehabilitation of some 
500 village irrigation schemes comprisingboth tanks and anicuts. The project 
works included: 
a)  Repairs to andor strengthening of embankments. 
b)  Repairs  to  sluice and  spillway structures of  the  tanks and  overflow 
structures of anicuts. 
c)  Replacement of sluice gates for tanks and installation of  new gates for 
anicuts. 
d)  Desilting andcleaningoffieldchannels.  Further, the landclearing for any 
new  areas brought  under  cultivation would  be  done by  the  farmers 
themselves. 
A set of  socioeconomic and technical criteria had been drawn up for 
selecting village tanks and anicuts for rehabilitation. 
Criteria for Village Tanks 
a)  Thecommandareaundereach tankshouldnothelessthan8 ha(20acres). 
b)  The useful storage of a tank should not be less than 50 percent of the yield 
c)  The tank should directly benefit at least ten families. 
d)  The rehabilitation costs should not be more than Rs 7,000per incremental 
irrigated acre (or Rs 17,290 per ha) at 1978 prices. 
e)  Thetankbedshouldnotbeofpervioussoils,andthetankshouldhavebeen 
filled at least three times in the past 10 years. 
potential. 
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t)  The total area benefited should be at least ten times the privately owned 
land to be submerged, if any. 
Criteria for Village Anicuts 
Catchment areas for an  independent anicut should not he less than  I .0 
square mile (2.6 km'). 
The distance between two anicuts on a stream should not he less than  I 
mile (1.61 km) and the catchment area between two anicuts should not be 
less than 0.5 square mile (I .3 km'). 
The command area should not be less than 12 ha (30 acres). 
The anicut should directly benefit at least 15 families. 
The  rehabilitation cost should not be more than Rs 7,000 per incremental 
irrigated area (I  7,290 per ha) at I978 prices. 
Lift Irrigation 
The project also made provision for 20 traditional type motor pumping units 
of 6-inch size and 2 of 12-inch size for lift irrigation from perennial streams 
and other water bodies for relief during periods of unexpected dry spells. The 
locations for constructions of forebays and main feeder channels were along 
perennial rivers like the Deduru Oya and the Maha Oya. 
Improved Water Management 
All the rehabilitated village irrigation schemes (as well as major schemes) 
were included in the improved Water Management Program.  The recom- 
mended method for  village schemes was the highly successful model developed 
at the MahaIlluppallamaResearch Station over several years since the 1970s. 
This  model emphasized the advantage  of the cropping calendar, the avoidance 
of staggered cultivation, the use of proper varieties and the mobilization of APPENDIX  N  71 
group action through education and training.  The support to carry out this 
model under the project included construction of regulators, control struc- 
tures, flow measurement devices, and equipment required for effective water 
management. Additional staffing for efficient water distribution andmanage- 
ment was also provided. APPENDIX  111 
Strategy of the Anuradhapura 
Dry-Zone Agriculture Project 
THE ADZAP  WAS designed to establish a technically viable and economically 
attractive farming system including irrigated rice and rain-fed upland crops. 
According to the report of the review mission of the ADB in 1986,  the revised 
project scope included the following activities: 
1.  Rehabilitating 138 minor tanks (decreased from 600 tanks). 
2.  Providing agricultural infrastructure and extension for permanent upland 
farming and intensified irrigated lowland farming in  1,620 ha (4,000 
acres) of command area (reduced from 8,100  ha [20,000  acres]). 
3.  Strengthening the livestock sector. 
4.  Providing agricultural support services. 
5.  Establishing amanagement unit for project implementation, coordination 
and monitoring. 
The  minor  tank  rehabilitation  consists  of  two components,  namely, 
upstream development and downstream development. 
Selection Criteria 
The ADZAP  strategy  included  two types  of  selection criteria, one for 
selecting bunded tanks and the other for selecting farmers to settle in the new 
allotments associated with those tanks.  The criteria of selection for minor 
tanks which were expected to have significant potential to support irrigated 
agriculture, were as follows. 
a)  ThecommandareaofeachtankshouldbegreaterthanSha(20acres) with 
a storage capacity of 0.91 hectare-meters  per hectare (3  acre-feet per acre) 
of command. 
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b)  Existence of  nearby settlements to  provide services and a labor pool 
during the construction stage. 
c)  The investment cost (pro rata) was to be a maximum of Rs 37.000 (in 
1982)  per ha for upstream works (catchment, tank bed, bund, sluice spill) 
and Rs I5.000perhafordownstreamdevelopment  (land clearing,channel 
consti-uction, and channel outlets). 
d)  The internal rate of return for cach tank was to be at least I5 percent  per 
year. 
In selecting settlers, the official selection criteria of thc Land Commis- 
sioner's Department were to be followed. These required that the knefici- 
aries should be farmers who were:  I) over 18 years of age, 2) married, 3) in 
residence in the area for over 7 years, and 4) totally landless.  The planned 
package of land for selected settlers under each tank was 0.4 ha (I acre) of 
irripted laud and 1.2 ha (3 acres) of highland: the strategy was the assisting 
of chena cultivators to become permanent settlers mainly by  allowing them 
to cultivate upland areas while the limited irrigated area was for subsistence. 
The project design included several closely related activities which were 
the  components  of  the  agricultural  infrastructure  improvement.  These 
activities were: a) land use planning and soil conservation; b)  establishment 
ofpermanent upland farms; c) intensification of irrigated lowland agriculture; 
d) strengthening of thc Maha-llluppallania Research and Training Center; 
and (e) strengthening of  the extension and establishment of demonstration 
plots. Being the most important aspect of  ADZAP, proper land use planning 
was required at the levels of overall projecl design, village, and individual 
farm.  Although the Project Appraisal Rcport is not very specific about land 
use planning for overall project design, it was implied that the final selection 
of  tanks  for rehabilitation  must  consider  allocation  of  lands  for major 
activities in the district.  The land use planning at village level was a very 
specific requirement while at the farm level, allocation of  lands for different 
cropping patterns to indicatc land occupancy was also required  (Somasiri 
1989). 
A viable farming system was supposed to he developed as a key element 
under thc project through the intensification of  agriculture in the irrigated 
lowland  area.  The essential requirement for crop intensification was the 
saving of  tank  water for a second crop after the maha season by timely 
cultivation and the cultivation of suitable varieties for optimum use of  the APPENDIX 111  7.5 
maha rainfall. A project-specific Water Management Program was designed 
to achieve these objectives. 
The rehabilitation process consisted of three components: 
I.  Upstream development work carried out by the Irrigation Department 
including surveying, engineering design, and repair and construction of. 
tank bunds, spills, and sluices. 
2.  Downstream development work undertaken hy the Department of Agrar- 
ian  Services, including land clearing and construction of channel  net- 
works. 
3.  Implementation  of  20  “pilot  schemes”  for  water  management.  also 
undertaken by the Department of Agrarian Services. APPENDIX 1V 
Strategy of the FFHC Board’s 
Tank Rehabilitation Program 
THE MAIN FOCUS of the rural development program of FFHC was on village 
tank restoration. The strategy adopted by FFHC to achieve its objectives has 
been: 1) therestorationof  tanks whichhavebeen neglectedoverthe years: and 
2) the renovation of working tanks (Puraana wewus)  which are still supporting 
the  traditional communities  in  the dry  zone but are mostly  in  a state of 
disrepair.  Due to the export-oriented commercial agriculture that prevailed 
among the dry-zone tank-based  communities, subsistence agriculture was 
neglected and farmers tended to make a living by chena cultivation in areas 
wherethere werefertilepermanent lowlandanduplandcrops  hasedonvillage 
tanks.  The continuation and expansion of chena cultivation all over the dry 
zone have upset the ecological balance of the environment and have impov- 
erished the land, resulting in shrub  jungle and bare land in place of the earlier 
climax forests. 
TheFFHC’sstrategy centeredon thehelief thatthisadverse trendofchena 
cultivation can be reversed by the farmers themselves with a little guidance, 
technical training, and financial assistance in matters that are beyond their 
present capacity (Wijetunga, 1986). 
Tank Selection 
“The Board  does not  intend to  implement a small wewa renovation 
programme of  its own.  Instead it enters into a partnership with the farmers 
living inandaroundtheabandoned wewas by using themeansofstoring water 
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and then helping these wew-sabhas to plan and implement their own devel- 
opment programmes.  The Board set out in January 1979 to ascertain the 
~nagnitudeofthisprogramme  and to buildafact-findingsystein which would 
permit  people  to  plan  such programmes  and  to organize  the  continued 
monitoring of their progress and achievements.  As a first step the Board 
numbered all the wewas (reservoirs) which had been shown on the one-inch- 
to-one-mile (1  :63,360)  scale topographical map of the country. 
“Over lX,oO()  wewas have been numbered almost all of which are in the 
dry zone.  It was noticed that many ahandoned wewas had escaped the notice 
of  the topographical surveyor because they were covered in scrub  jungle and 
were located in country infested with wild animals. When these are included, 
thc total number of wewas and reservoirs will exceed 30,000. Ofthis number 
about 7,000ornearlyaquarterarestill in working orderandsupporting wewa- 
village communities” (ibid). 
The FFHC developed a selection process which began with the request 
from villagers for thc renovation of  their tank, and was complemented by a 
socioeconomic survey and a feasibility study before the preliminary selection 
was made. The availability of lands within the tank system was ensured after 
which a bund capacity survey was carried out before obtaining the clearance 
from the District Agricultural  Committee and the Irrigation Department. 
After these technical stages a n’ew-sahha  was formed when tank renovation 
or rehabilitation work commenced. 
Restoration Process 
Tank selection for the villagc tank rehabilitation program of FFHC was based 
on thc objective of  improving the quality of life of  people living in areas 
outside  the  command  areas of  the  major-  and  medium-scalc  irrigation 
schemes. The tank renovation program was coupled to wew-sabhas of the 
beneficiaries whotooktheleadindecidingtheirworkplanfvrthedevelopment 
of their own community.  The FFHC’s general policy was the use of manual 
laborin theconstruction work which wastheprimeresponsibilityofthe wew- 
sahha members and their families. The whole bund work was done in this 
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theattendant benefit  softheir  own development. One halfofthevalueof work 
was paid for (at Rs 40 per cube 1100 cubic feet]) while the other half was 
considered as the farmers' contribution to tank restoration.  During the first 
three months, each family could earn Rs 700 to Rs 1,000 through this labor- 
based construction work.  It was hoped lo motivate people for participatory 
development through this process. 
The 'FFHC Board emphasized the importance of the ancient tank-based 
culture where practices such as the "three-fields" system were followed for 
centuries; it also emphasized the revival of such traditional agricultural and 
other cultural practices before going into modem technology.  The three- 
fields system of  ownership in  the command area allowed the farmers to 
cultivatericeat least inonepartoftheaswedumizedareawhich isdividedinto 
three ficlds during critical periods.  The farmers would he entitled to an 
allotment in each of the three fields, -  upper, middle and lower field of the 
command area -  under  which  each  family  would  get  an  allotment  or 
panguwa. 
The small tank rehabilitation process involved two important stages, re- 
construction of the tank  system and settlement of  landless families under 
them. The rehabilitation was supposed to be organized by the participation 
of the Rural Development Society which was the village level nongovemment 
organimtion meant for rural development.  One Rural Development Society 
normally represented more than one tank area or one hamlet.  The Board. 
however, felt that the poorest of the poor farmers who were the target group 
of its tank rehabilitation program were not adequately represented in Rural 
Development Societies since the local elite were the office bearers, who were 
not generally interested in the upliftment of the poorest group. Therefore, to 
bring aboutthedirect participation of  tbepoorestfarmers.the wew-sabha was 
established since 1980, making the tank the focal point of activity to harness 
theresourcesofall farmers. Thisreservoircouncil was similar to what existed 
in the ancient times hut with modifications to suit the present context.  The 
wew-sabhd members would decide the construction programs and the settle- 
ment activities with the consent of the majority of the members.  Some 200 
such  wew-sabhas  were  set up  for the  implementation  of  FFHC's  tank 
rehabilitation program, based on a model developed in the IhalaDiganaTank 
village in Anuradhapura District (ibid). 80  A REVIEW OF IILTERNATIVE  STRAmZIES FOR  IMPROVING  PMlS 
Construction Stage 
Restoration of some 200 tanks was the original target of the Board,  These 
village tanks were located in 5 districts in the form of 10 tank clusters. The 
districts were Anuradhapura,  Matale,  Moneragala, Puttalam,  andTrincomalee. 
The average cost of construction per tank was estimated at Rs 215,000 (in 
1986)  and planning, monitoring, and labor wages were to be met locally. The 
farmers werepaidfortheirlaborworkatarateof 50percentofthe totalvalue 
of work on the basis of volume of work. According to FFHC’s implementa- 
tion guidelines for tank restoration, no type of machinery was  used and 
contractors  were not employed.  The earthwork of  each tank  was  done 
manually by the wew-sabha members and their families. This was practiced 
for two purposes: 
a)  It enabled the participating members to earn a living while working for 
their own development. 
h)  It helped to motivate the people and to prepare them to be active fanners 
in the management of their own lands and the tank system. 
The tank construction comprised three major activities: a) the reservoir 
dam reconstruction up  to a height of 9 feet above the spill level; b)  the 
reconstruction of the sluice for controlled release of water; and c) the recon- 
struction of  the  water  distribution  system in order to ensure  the  equal 
distribution of water. The useful storage of the tank was expected to be 0.91 
ham  per ha (3 acre-feet per acre). The Board introduced the step-type sluice 
in place of the village-type sluice.  It was also expected that the wew-sabha 
members would attend to the repair and maintenance work of the tank and 
channel system at all times after the restoration. The tank maintenance fund 
and “shramadana” (donations of free labor) were used for these post-project 
activities.  Although the maintenance of  a working tank was generally a 
responsibility of the Agrarian Services Department or the Irrigation Depart- 
ment, the Board made a “condition” that beneficiaries should maintain their 
own tank system. 
The Board’s strategy of land consolidation was to encourage wew-sabha 
members to relinquish their present ownership of land to the state and then to 
claim a package of land which consisted of 0.8  ha (2  acres) of rice land, 0.2 
ha (0.5 acre) of homestead and 0.4 ha (one acre) of highland totaling 1.4 ha 
(3.5 acres) for each family. This was equal to or even more than the benefits APPENDIX rv  81 
obtained from any land alienation process implemented under state interven- 
tion.  Thus, FFHC provided a significant opportunity to each farm family, 
otherwise lacking landownershipor  a means ofpermanent livelihood, to  have 
an economic unit of land. The total cultivable area including the lowland has 
been increased considerably. The expected average size of a tank area was 20 
ha (50 acres) of irrigahle land with a membership of about 25. But in the 
implementation stage, the size of an average tank area has been diminished. 
According to the recent asessment  study done in Thanthinmale by IIMI, the 
average size was less than 8 ha (20 acres) with 10 families: there were some 
tanks withonly3familieshavingacommandareaofonly2.5  ha(6acres). The 
range of imgable area was thus 2.5 to 20 ha (6 to 50 acres). 
The use of stored water in the small tank systems was meant to prevent 
crop failure during dry spells. Rain water was intended to be used for land 
preparation work, andtank water wasnotexpected toheissued  throughout the 
cultivation season as happened in major irrigation schemes. Prior to the main 
cultivation season and monthly thereafter, farmers of  the wew-sabba were 
supposed  to meet to plan the cultivation calendar under their tank and to 
decide the variety of rice grown and dates for fencing the perimeter.  The 
fanners were also expected to plan and participate in the agricultural devel- 
opment in theirhomesteadandmarket-gardens  and todecideon the sizeofthe 
livestock that each farm family could maintain. 
Agriculture Support Assistance 
Dispersed individual families dependent upon chena cultivation  were ex- 
pected to organize themselves into coherent groups under the wew-sabha to 
plan and manage their socioeconomic activities including community devel- 
opment and social welfare. In fulfilling these socioeconomic objectives the 
FFHC Board provided supplementary assistance like interest-free loans and 
agricultural inputs. Each wew-sabhacultivatingrice  was provided with afree 
sprayerforcommonuse. The wew-sabhas werealsoencouraged to raise their 
own funds for necessary purchase of agricultural inputs prior to cultivation 
and store them in the room of  the wew-sabha building, for the use of all 
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Agricultural development outside the tank command area was also well- 
planned by the Board, aiming at a balanced crop development.  The home- 
stead and market-garden fanning (1.5 acres) were enhanced by  providing 
assistance for a dug-well which may be used  for supplementing irrigation for 
upland crops in addition to domestic use.  The assistance for a well was Rs 
6,000which wasanoutrightgrantforeachfamily settledunderatanksystem; 
it was paid both in kind and in cash. 
Inaddition to tank restoration and other agricultural development activities, 
each wew-sabha was provided with a grant of Rs  65,000 for the construction 
of a permanent builditig; the bare-minimum equipment was also supplied to 
this building which was to be used for holding wew-sabha meetings and for 
storing agricultural inputs. 
The FFHC's  tank rehabilitation  program  was funded  by  four foreign 
agencies namely Welthungerhilfe, S witrerland Intercooperation, Australian 
FFHC, and Community Aid Abroad (Australia). APPENDIX V 
Strategy of the National Development Foundation 
Tank Selection 
THEcwriinin ~ou  selectionofminor irripationsystems included: a)  thecapacity 
of the tank; b)  the economic backwardness of the community that depended 
on the tank; c)  the fanners’ desire for external help to improve their irrigation 
systems; d)  the lack of  help from any other source to renovate the tank; and 
e) the landownership pattern under the tank. 
The specific objectives of the tank renovation project of the NDF were the 
following: 
a)  To renovate village tanks with the help of the beneficiaries so that they 
would develop some sense of ownership of  the tank and maintain it by 
themselves. 
b)  To initiate and develop a suitable institutional arrangement which would 
effect a proper coordination  system between fanners and government 
officials. 
c) To introduce modern agricultural techniques to farmer groups. 
d) To  promote  traditional  practices of  water  management  and  related 
activities. 
e) To  train  a  team  of  local  youths  as  change-agents of  agricultural 
development. 
fj  To organize informaleducational programs for farmers in irrigation water 
management. 
These objectives were to  be achieved  following sequential  stages of 
Earmer mobilization. The NDF coordinators first approached the farmers to 
carry out preliminary investigations such as their socioeconomic background 
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and technical aspects related to the renovation program. The first step was to 
meet individual farmers to have a friendly dialogue leading to bringing them 
together  into coherent groups.  Then the group discussions were held to 
organize them into independent farmer societies, where a society fund was 
collected with farmers’ contributions.  This group-formation process took 
several months.  The socioeconomic survey was then canied out, during 
which period free interaction took place between the NDF coordinators and 
the farmergroups. The technical survey was thenconducted by theTechnical 
Assistant of the Department of Agrarian Services with the farmers’ participa- 
tion which was particularly forthcoming in the tank bed, catchment, bund, and 
command areas. 
Planning Procedure 
On the basis of the information collected by these surveys, a report was 
prepared by the NDF coordinators with the assistance of youths who were 
selected to  represent  each tank  for training  as “change  agents.”  They 
motivated the farmer societies to evaluate their own situation and to collec- 
tively discuss the project activities during the intervention stage. Because of 
this farmer participation at the initial and design stages, farmers were well 
aware of the tank capacity, the quantity of water each rice tract could receive, 
and the procedure of maintaining the catchment area as well as the other tank 
components. 
The systematic procedure which included group discussions, youth train- 
ing and informal farmer training would lead to  introducing an effective Water 
Management Program  under  each  tank.  Supplementary  to the  overall 
program,  the  farmers  appointed  committees  to  implement  the  different 
programs  for  water  management,  down-stream  development,  catchment 
development and forest cover conservation.  The farmer fund was created 
with the contributions made by farmers in cash or from their harvest in kind 
(0.5-1 bushel [  10.20  kg] of grains). After the preliminary surveys, technical 
reports and visits by the Technical Assistant, a ratification meeting was held 
with the farmers and the technical officer to finalize the program with the 
beneficiary consent.  Then the proposal was sent to the prospective donors 
through the NDF head office for funding. Once the project was accepted and 
approved, it was notified to the farmer organizations and to  the implementing APPENDIX  V  85 
agencies who prepared the detailed estimates for implementation. The work 
plan was drawn up to implement the renovation activities where responsibili- 
ties of farmers as well as agencies were clearly defined. 
The Renovation Stage 
Four groups of organizations were involved in the whole process of tank 
renovation of the National Development Foundation. They were: 1)  the Tank 
Committee; 2) the National  Development  Foundation;  3) the  Australian 
Freedom From Hunger Campaign [AFFHC]; and 4) the Government of Sri 
Lanka.  As NDF had put fanners first, a prominent place was given to 
beneficiaries  who  were  represented  in  the Tank Committee  which  was 
involved from the initial project identification to the post-project evaluation. 
Fanners were the informants to the Technical Assistants of the Department of 
Agrarian Services ahout water distribution difficulties.  They contributed 
labor for rehabilitation and also shared a certain percentage of  renovation 
costs with NDF. 
The NDF had played the role of  facilitator for the farmers’ work, by 
motivating them into groups to plan the renovation programs, channeling the 
AFFHC’s funds, and coordinating government assistance to the individual 
tank level.  Whilst AFFHC was the chief funding agency for the project, the 
Government of Sri Lanka contributed its share by extending the services of 
DAS and the Irrigation Department for physical renovation of the tanks and 
institution building for the intended Water Management Program. The NDF 
had encouraged farmers through its experimental tenure project, to take over 
the operation and maintenance after rehabilitation and to generate a sense of 
ownership of the systems among themselves. 
The pre-renovation condition prevented the cultivation of the total com- 
mand area even during the wet (maha) season owing to defects in the tank. 
Before renovation the tanks were typified by defects in sluice, heavy siltation, 
weak hunds and leakage of stored water.  These defects resulted in reduced 
cultivation (between 1/4 to  1/3 of the total command area during the maha 
season). Most of these tanks did not have any yala cultivation for 25 years or 
so, owing to  these defects.  Under the drought relief program of the govern- 
ment, fanners of some of these tanks participated in the food-for-work type 
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But there was no  catalytic process to motivate farmers to rally into groups for 
achieving common goals. 
The construction work started just after the action plan was approved by 
NDF  and the farmers. The period of construction was usually the dry season, 
during which no cultivation was possible and the beneficiariescouldcontinu- 
ously work in the tanks.  The farmers participated in physical work which 
included clearing the tank bund and channel and all earthwork.  The farmers 
accepted (as under FFHC) Rs 40 per cube (I00  cubic feet), which is half the 
farmers'estimateofRs80(the standard rate ofDAS  forthe  same was Rs I  10). 
The remaining Rs40 percuht: was kept as the farmers' contribution for other 
costs. The filling, leveling and compacting of earth were carried out by using 
heavy machinery which is in variance with the FFHC approach. The farmers 
contributed money (from their earnings) to hire tractors to transport earth for 
bund filling. The DAS provided a tractor at a subsidized rate of Rs 375 a day 
for 15 days. The farmers filled the bund with the dug-out earth from the tank 
bed.  They also attended to masonry workof the sluice and spill construction. 
The farmers contributed 50 percent of their total earnings while each farmer 
collected Rs  60-75 per day from the construction work. 
(e.g., 
Mawathagama tank) NDF hired a bulldozer from DAS to attend to such heavy 
work. For this work farmers raised funds for fuel for the bulldozer and they 
contributed Rs 500 for each acre cultivated under a given tank. 
During the renovation period, initially, the farmers received DAS-organ- 
izeddroughtreliefassistance  while NDFpaid the farmers their dues according 
to their work records as early as possible. In the renovation process resources 
received from all four parties involved were substantial.  These resources 
included finance, labor, machinery, materials, and services. These resources 
with the sources are summarked below. 
* The  Farmers: Fifty percent of the value of the labor used for earthwork. 
andperiodicshramadanawork;contributionfrom  theirsavingstoraiseabank 
account, and money collected by selling the fish catch in four tanks. 
* The Department of  Agrarian Services: Services of the Technical Offic- 
ers, without any service commission; provision of heavy machinery at a low 
charge; other general administrative and liaison services to resolve encroach- 
ment  and other land  matters  with  the  Government Agent  and  the  Land 
Commissioner's Department. 
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* The National Development Foundation: Being coordinator  and facilitator 
in channeling finances and services from other agencies such as the farmer, 
the  DAS.  and  AFFHC:  and  above  all  motivating  farmers  for  resource 
mobilization and management. 
* The Australian Freedom from Hunger Campaign: A fund of over Rs I .2 
million as the contribution channeled through NDF. Bibliography 
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